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ABSTRACT 
With rig-operation rates of a million dollars a day it is absolutely necessary to ensure that all 
drilling and well contractors perform satisfactory and deliver according to contract.  There 
are many ways to organize the related transactions and potential associated relations to 
ensure efficient governance structures.  In this thesis, I have analyzed actual contracts and 
interviewed a range of industry professionals concerning contractual - and relational 
governance.  The findings indicate that the formal governance is mostly neoclassical, but that 
it is complemented with informal relational contracts, and when a relationship is well 
established this relational governance sometimes supersedes what is agreed to in the formal 
contracts.  The results further indicate that formal contracts on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf appear to have a higher degree of formalization than those of Gulf of Mexico, and that 
the main factors that impacts the degree of formalization are the market conditions, security 
of supply, and risk mitigation. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The offshore drilling - and well services industry is characterized by global competition, 
complex services, exposed working conditions, and high costs.  New markets, increasing 
competition, and stricter regulation are consolidating the industry through mergers and 
acquisitions.  The “easy oil” has been produced, and the more complex, riskier and costly 
well operations are therefore now required for the production of oil.   
With this in mind, oil and gas companies aim to obtain safe and efficient drilling operations 
at the lowest possible cost.  The way the industry is structured today, the oil and gas 
companies cannot drill a well by them selves.  Actually, 95 – 98 percent of the cost of drilling 
a well comes from contracted services, and approximately 30 percent of these are related to 
drilling and well services.  The complexity of the work, and the high degree of value creation 
performed by contractors, necessitates a close relationship between buyer and seller, and a 
comprehensive control system. 
In Norway, drilling and well services are contracted through rather detailed long term 
exclusive agreements with duration of 3-4 years, with a firm scope, technical specifications 
and associated compensation.  In the US Gulf of Mexico, on the other hand, most companies 
have evergreen agreed-upon terms and conditions without a firm scope, and they quote 
individual jobs on a much more frequent basis.   
The focus point for this thesis is the documentation of the current governance structures and 
reason for any regional difference in these.  Therefore, much time has been spent studying 
relevant governance mechanisms and criteria for choosing governance that is fit for purpose. 
Fundamental and applicable publications and theories from leading scholars is in this respect, 
amongst others; “Nature of the firm” by Ronald Coase (1937), “The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism” by Oliver E. Williamson (1985) and Ian MacNeil’s “The Many Future of 
Contracts” (1974) and “The New Social Contract” (1980). 
The importance of proper management of contractors has in the past year become evident due 
to the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico.  The accident led to the loss of 11 lives and 
the biggest oil spill in US history.  The operator, BP, has now sued its contractors 
Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron for 40 billion dollars for being negligent and/or for 
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concealing information.  Could such an accident have been prevented if there had been 
different governance structures that facilitated better communication between the parties, 
rather than lengthy contracts filled with penalties? It is too early to answer this question, but 
the way contractual relationships are structured is clearly relevant and applicable as an area of 
investigation. 
The motivation for addressing contractual - and relational governance structures, and regional 
differences between the Norwegian Continental Shelf and the US Gulf of Mexico, comes 
mainly from the perception about comprehensiveness of the US law, and complexity in US 
contracts. Having somewhat of a knowledge about contracts for the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf and evaluating this up against the US contracting practices sounded interesting 
considering the continuous globalization of the drilling and well industry and the increased 
focus on supplier/client relationship management. 
1.2 Problem description 
This thesis seeks to identify current governance structures, and explain the difference in 
governance structures between the Norwegian Shelf and the Gulf of Mexico by answering the 
following four questions:  
1) What types of contracts are used for drilling and well services on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf and the US Gulf of Mexico?  
2 ) Are there any differences in the degree of formalization (content and structure) 
in contracts applicable for the Norwegian Continental Shelf and the US Gulf of 
Mexico, and if so what are these differences? 
3) What factors may have impacted the degree of formalization? 
4) Does the type of contract and degree of formalization change over time? If so, 
    how does it change?  
1.3 Delimitations 
Cost drivers and risk picture are very different between onshore and offshore drilling 
operations.  Contracts are therefore also different.  It is therefore important to emphasize that 
this thesis focuses on drilling and well services contracts for offshore operations only.   
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1.4 Disposition 
This master thesis consists of eight chapters and two appendices.  Chapter 1 is this 
introduction.  Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework.  Chapter 3 gives a brief 
overview of the relevant business context.  Chapter 4 describes the methodology for data 
acquisition and the use of the collected data.  Chapter 5 contains the results and findings from 
the data acquisition.  Chapter 6 provides the discussion and argumentation, chapter 7 contains 
the conclusion, and chapter 8 lists the references used.  The appendices give further 
information on key theoretical aspects related to relational contracts, and include the 
interview guide.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The theoretical framework is meant to give an overview of the theories relevant for this 
thesis, and later be the academic basis in discussions and rationale for conclusions.  First I 
will touch upon the basic economic organization.  Following this I will take a closer look at 
transaction cost economics and analysis (TCA), the relevance of TCA, and its important 
behavioral assumptions.   
The latter part of this framework focuses on contract theory, from discrete to alliance 
contracts with a focus on relational contracting theory (RCT).  This section will end up in a 
discussion on contract types and which ones that are relevant for this thesis.  Finally, an 
attempt at a definition for degree of formalization, and elements impacting degree of 
formalization.   
2.2 The Economic Organization 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 19) defines the economic organization as “created entities 
within and through which people interact to reach individual and collective economic goals”.   
Such organization can either be the economy as a whole or the independent firm or 
corporation, which this thesis concerns.   The key characteristic of an organization at this 
level is that it is considered a separate legal entity with the right to enter into contracts, try it 
out in court and doing so in the name of the organization and not the individual belonging to 
the organization (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
The ability to enter into binding contracts is not only critical for one of the major economic 
analysis of organizations, but also for the impact of human behavior which will be thoroughly 
elaborated on later in this chapter. 
Transaction cost theory tells us that the basic unit for analysis of the economic organization is 
the transaction of goods and services, and how this is organized within the organization 
(Williamson, 1985 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  Unless we are talking about a 
monopoly situation, it is assumed that that an organization would seek efficiency in 
organizing these transactions.  Efficiency as a term is widely used in organizational and 
economic theory, but for the matter of this thesis we will define efficiency as doing the things 
right as opposed to doing the right things (Drucker, 1973).   
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2.3 Transaction Cost Theory 
2.3.1. History of Transaction Cost Theory 
The term transaction cost economics surfaced about 40 years ago, but originates as far back 
as the 1930’s and is a micro analytical approach to studying the economic organization.  This 
approach focuses on the transaction and the effects such transactions have on the 
organization, however not only concerning the economic aspect, but also relating to 
organizational theory and law (Williamson, 1985).   
The legal aspect was attended to by Karl Llewellyn in 1931 where he addressed the need to 
interpret contracts with the original purpose and to think of them more as framework which 
in hindsight almost never depicted the actual working situation.  At the time, focus was on 
interpreting the actual letters and words (legalistic approach) in the actual contracts which 
usually won through both in law and economics at the time (Williamson, 1985 and 
Williamson and Masten, 1999). 
Chester Barnard’s “The Function of the Executive” (1938) addressed the importance of 
organizational processes and cooperation versus organizational principles which had been the 
focus of organizational theorist at the time.  Barnard emphasized the importance of the 
informal organization (focus on communication, self-integrity, personal relationships, etc.) 
within the formal organization.  He also called attention to intended rationality, later renamed 
to bounded rationality, a key term in transaction cost economics which will be re-visited 
more thoroughly later (Williamson, 1985 and Williamson and Masten, 1999). 
Frank Knight, John Commons and Ronald Coase did all make significant contributions to the 
study of transaction cost economics in the early 1900.  Knight (1965, in Williamson, 1985) 
focused on the importance of human mind and behavior, and how organization should be 
aware of opportunism.  Commons (1934, in Williamson, 1985) attempted to show that the 
purpose of economic organization was to enable trade through continuous relationships and 
customized governance structure, instead of letting such relations fail by pure market 
contracting.  Commons was also the one who, in 1934 introduced the transaction, the transfer 
of goods and services from one individual to another, as the basic unit of analysis 
(Williamson, 1985 and Williamson and Masten, 1999).   
6 
Ronald Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) is known to be the path breaking 
contribution to transaction cost economics.  Coase did not use the term transaction cost at the 
time, but the cost of using the price mechanism or market as we would say it today.  In his 
article Coase tried to explain why we have organizations (or firms) running the economy 
instead of numerous self-employed individuals who have entered into contracts with one 
another trying to achieve the same purpose.  Without organizing this in a firm under one 
management, you would have very high number of exchanges just to produce simple 
products.  Imagine if every step of the assembly line was a new company and all the 
associated cost would have to be passed on to the finished product.  The costs of these market 
transactions are just too high compared to the cost of internal co-ordination under one 
management (Douma and Schreuder, 1999).  In his article, Coase (1937) further looked at 
when an organization would emerge and under what conditions one would hire instead of 
contracting out.   
2.3.2. Transaction Cost 
Transaction costs are costs associated with a transaction or a range of transactions between 
two or more parties.  A transaction therefore indicates some kind of contractual relationship 
between the parties from the simplest form, in the way of a strict purchase (buying a Coke-a-
Cola over the counter) to the more complex form in the way of a long lasting relationship 
(tendering, contract negotiations and contract administration).  More specific, transaction 
costs are often divided into what is known as ex-ante (prior) and ex-post (after) transaction 
cost depending on a cost bearing activity related to the transaction itself that takes place 
before or after the agreement has commenced (Williamson, 1985).   
In short, transaction cost analysis focuses on the cost of running the system.  If this cost is so 
high that it offsets the production benefits in the market then it should be organized internally 
(Rindfleish and Heide, 1997). 
2.3.3. Transaction Cost Economics and Behavioral Assumptions 
Understanding the behavioral assumptions to transaction cost economics is essential, not only 
to obtain a better understanding about transaction cost economics itself, but also for the 
relationship between transaction cost economics and contracting.  It is in the process of 
entering into a contractual relationship (ex-ante) or in the contract period itself (ex-post) 
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where these behavioral assumptions will make a difference and must be dealt with.  Oliver 
Williamson puts this in perspective: 
Any attempt to deal seriously with the study of economic organization must come to 
the terms with the combined ramification of bounded rationality and opportunism in 
conjunction with a condition of asset specificity. 
      (Williamson, 1985, p. 42) 
2.3.3.1. Bounded Rationality 
The assumption of bounded rationality, introduced by Herbert Simon in the mid 1900s, holds 
that humans intend to act rationally, but have limited ability to do so (Williamson, 1985).  
This basically means that we as human beings cannot understand or comprehend all possible 
outcomes or consequences from all possible options in a given situations (Kolltveit and Reve, 
2006).  In other words, bounded rationality is the difference between complete knowledge 
and actual knowledge about a given situation.  It is not a chosen delta, but due to our limited 
ability to access, remember and process information.  Without this delta we would be able to 
conduct complete contracting, and thereby significantly reduce ex-post transaction 
costs/contractual issues (Williamson, 1985).  A complete contract is defined as a 
“hypothetical contract that describes what action is to be taken and payments made in every 
possible contingency” (Milgrom and Roberts, 2006, p. 597).  It is given that trying to compile 
large complete EPCI (Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installation) or service 
contracts would entail enormous transaction costs just in writing the scope of work.  
Complete contracts, however, rarely appears in other than “purchase” transaction where 
product delivery, payment and consumption occurs at the time of order, for example when 
you buy a gum over the counter.   
As for more complex business related contracts we are left with incomplete contracts, due to 
the presence of bounded rationality.  This may leave room for greater ex-post cost, which 
may include: 
1) Process cost associated with re-aligning a business relationship 
2) Actual cost to realign the ex-post misalignments 
3) Arbitration costs or sometimes even court proceedings 
8 
 As a result of not being able to word out all possible contingencies, companies establish 
“safeguards” to protect against opportunistic behavior from the other party (Williamson 
1985). 
2.3.3.2. Opportunism 
Williamson (1985, p. 47) defines opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile”.  In more 
practical terms behaving opportunistic would mean intentionally twist, distort or withhold 
information to confuse or mislead the other party.  Without the risk of opportunistic behavior 
a contract would be able to govern all behavior.  This risk is real, and present in most 
business related agreements.  It often arises due to private or asymmetric information.  
Williamson (1985) further emphasizes that you cannot know for sure who will act 
opportunistic and certain ex-ante and ex-post safeguards should therefore be established. 
Private information, although also important post contract, is often considered as basis for 
pre-contractual opportunism.  From the insurance industry we recognize this as adverse 
selection where the people who are buying insurance do so because they perceive themselves 
to obtain an above average benefit under the insurance policy (Milgrom and Roberts, 2006).  
Milgrom and Roberts points to the examples of a pregnant woman who in the US may buy 
health insurance knowing that she is pregnant, or the car buyer who buys extended warranties 
because he knows that he will put the car into rough use.  Both of these are examples of 
people who have private information that is not shared with the other party.   
In the business world an example of pre-contractual opportunism can be someone who bids in 
low quality equipment or materials if he knows that there are no contract penalties for 
equipment and materials that does not meet specifications.  There are of course ways to work 
around this and Milgrom and Roberts (2006) presents signaling and screening as methods 
that the buyer can use: 
 Signaling – A method where the seller may seek accreditation or renown certification to 
prove to the seller that the business holds a certain standard or that the equipment meet 
specific requirements.  Such accreditation or certification may separate a company from 
competition.  This signals to the buyer that the seller holds a certain standard of quality 
and less effort may go into further qualification of the business or the 
equipment/materials in question. 
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 Screening – A method where the seller undertake an exercise to screen a number of 
available suppliers.  A long list becomes a short list through evaluation of these suppliers 
against sufficient qualification criteria, both on paper and through actual site visits.  The 
screening may be performed on a product, process, quality or company level, however 
most evaluations are according to Van Weele (2005) limited to the two first levels. 
 
Risk of opportunistic behavior is also present after the contract has been entered into.  Before 
going deeper into this a reference is made to the insurance industry, this time referencing 
Moral Hazard.  As opposed to adverse selection, we are now discussing a situation where a 
party actually has insurance, and on that basis changes behaviors that leads to larger claims 
against the insurance companies (Milgrom and Roberts, 2006). 
A direct link can be drawn to a business relationship.  We are discussing post contractual 
opportunism where a party chooses to act a certain way because he sees an opportunity to 
obtain larger profits on account of the other party.  Post contractual opportunism may come in 
the form of: 
• Strategic Pricing – where the seller has won a contract on an artificial low price level 
and may now scale up the price because the buyer did not put sufficient efforts into 
evaluating the buyer’s offer (Kolltveit and Reve, 2002 and Van Weele, 2005). 
o Were all required items priced according to instructions? 
o Does the equipment meet specifications? 
o Are the specifications complete or should additional work be expected?  
o Did the seller have any exceptions to the terms of the contract? 
• Hold Up Problems – where an asset specific investment has been made by a party in a 
co-specialized contract relationship and the other party forces lower rates upon the 
first party.  The initial party is by definition held up because of larger asset specific 
investments that will lose significant value unless use as intended (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 2006). 
If all information was out in the open it would not been necessary to assume an opportunistic 
behavior, and the added transaction cost of establishing safeguards could be avoided.  
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Williamson (1985) does however emphasize that he does not assume all people to behave 
opportunistic.  The problem is however that lack of ex-ante transparency limits the parties’ 
ability to trust one another.  The answer to this is upfront screening and safeguards that 
govern the contractual relationship.  Williamson (1985) states that ex-post opportunism may 
be significantly reduced if ex-ante safeguards are instituted, and argues that such safeguards 
can take one or more of three forms: 
1) Use of incentives and penalties or remuneration for termination 
2) Use of contractual governance mechanisms for dispute resolution, such as arbitration 
in case of disagreement that cannot be solved between the contracting parties 
3) Use of “trading regularities” to extend trade between the parties through reciprocity 
requirements 
More practically this would include building contract frameworks through relational 
contracting.  This framework does not try to foresee and distribute risk for all possible 
contingencies, but governs what criteria apply in unforeseen situations, and this subject will 
be touched upon shortly. 
There is somewhat of an agreement to that bounded rationality is an appropriate behavioral 
assumption when describing the economic organization, but there are some critics to the use 
of opportunism for the same.  Maria Moschandreas (1997) argues that opportunism is too 
narrow to describe human behavior, while Klein (2006) argues that Williamson’s use of 
opportunism is purely instrumental.   
Williamson (1985) himself does not reference specific critics, but responds to this criticism 
by looking at a contracting world without the behavioral assumptions of transaction cost 
economics.  He divides this into four possible options: (1) A world without opportunism and 
bounded rationality, in theory, sounds really nice, but is close to none existing.  This would 
mean that everyone knows everything, from the past, in the present and in the future, and 
through this, opportunism impossible.  (2) Absence of bounded rationality will require an 
enormous amount of work in order to capture all contingencies, because all future possible 
outcomes or situations needs to be described (3) Absence of opportunism is a place where 
general clauses protects against incomplete contracting, instead of today where there are 
specific clauses included in the contract to prevent opportunistic behavior (i.e. agree on unit 
pricing for variation orders to avoid hold up/lock in problems). (4) Presence of both bounded 
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rationality and opportunism is a place or scenario that describes reality.  This is summarized 
in the table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 - Contracting in absence of Opportunism and Bounded Rationality 
  Condition of Bounded Rationality 
  Absent Admitted 
Condition of 
Opportunism 
Absent (1) Bliss (3) “General Clause Contracting” 
Admitted 
(2) Comprehensive 
Contracting 
(4) Serious Contractual Difficulties 
 
Note.  From The Economic Institution of Capitalism, p.67, by O.  E.  Williamson, 1985, New 
          York: The Free Press. 
 
2.3.4. Dimensions of Transactions 
How a transaction is organized within an organization depends on its dimensions.  For 
example, if a transaction is complex, an organization may require a more comprehensive 
procurement process and thereby spending more money selecting a vendor.  Williamson 
(1985) introduced three such dimensions; asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency, which 
later has been a point for discussion in many publications, amongst others Kolltveit and Reve 
(2002) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992). 
2.3.4.1. Asset Specificity 
A transaction has a degree of asset specificity if a party has project specific investments that 
would be of lower value or no value to this party unless used for the specific project 
(Williamson, 1985).  Buying a Coka-a-Cola over the counter has very low degree of asset 
specificity because limited upfront cost was required to make the transaction.  On the other 
side, if a ship yard has to be built in order to receive an order for a new drilling rig, then the 
transaction has a higher degree of asset specificity.  The yard owner, which has invested in 
property, cranes, equipment, infrastructure, expert personnel can’t, without additional 
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investments, easily use the yard for other profitable purposes.  Williamson (1985) divides 
asset specificity in four: 
• Site specificity – If the yard is built at a special geographical location, it is hard, if 
not impossible to move it. 
• Physical asset specificity – Investments in technology customized IT-equipment.   
• Human asset specificity – relates to cost of recruiting and training new employees, 
even though much training may be used for other purposes as well without loss of 
significant value (Kolltveit and Reve, 2002). 
• Dedicated asset - a purpose build ship yard crane to facilitate a new generation 
drilling rigs. 
Asset specificity is very important in a contracting view.  With low asset specificity it could 
be most efficient to conduct spot purchases because of the low transaction cost.  However, 
when you have high asset specificity and a certain frequency it will be more feasible to avoid 
daily negotiations on the price for the next day.  Seller and buyer can therefore either agree to 
merge or enter into a long term contractual relationship for supply and use of a certain good   
(Douma and Schreuder, 2002).  This is often what is referred to as either neoclassical or 
relational contracting which we will cover later. 
2.3.4.2. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a key component in various economic theories, including transaction cost 
economics.  In this setting, uncertainty mainly relates to the complexity of describing the 
situation encompassing and interfacing with the transaction ex-ante as well as the difficulty 
of verifying, monitoring and controlling the potential opportunistic behavior ex-post 
(Williamson, 1985).   
2.3.4.3. Frequency 
Basic organizational theory tells us that unique time limited work should be organized in a 
project, while routine / every - day work should be not.  Grey and Larson (2006, p. 5) defines 
a project as “a complex, non routine, one-time effort limited by time, budget, resources, and 
performance specifications designed to meet customer needs”.  A specialized governance 
structure, like a project, is associated with relatively higher cost and the question is whether it 
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can be justified (Williamson, 1985).  On the other side, where transactions happen frequently 
over time, and where the frame conditions are known, people tend to automate or somehow 
make the transaction more efficient and thereby reducing transaction costs (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
You also have items that fall between the standard routine work and a full blown project.  
Williamson (1985, p. 60) elaborates “Where frequency is low but the needs for nuanced 
governance are great, the possibility of aggregating the demands of similar but independent 
transactions is suggested.” An example is Transocean, the world’s largest offshore drilling 
rig owner, who orders two to four drilling rigs at the time.  Here, after construction starts on 
the first rig, the organization has a great amount of learning that can be applied for the 
remaining drilling rigs and thereby reducing production cost and potentially also transaction 
costs.  There are however limited research available on transaction cost and scale economics 
to make any clear statements (Williamson 1985 and Kolltveit and Reve, 2006). 
2.3.5. Transaction Costs - Summary  
This section has in brief covered transaction cost economics, behavioral assumptions, 
dimension and limitations.  The key things to take away from this section are 1) the 
importance of the behavioral assumptions, 2) the role of dimensions when organizing the 
transactions (market or vertical integration) and least 3) an understanding of the relationship 
between transaction cost economics and contracts.   
2.4 The Theory of Contract and Relational Contracting 
The following section gives an introduction to basic contract theory, assumptions, and 
implications.  Further, in order to fully understand relational contracting I go into depth on 
the extremes; - discrete and relational contracts.  Towards the end of the section, I touch upon 
contract norms followed by a section describing the various contract types available. Finally I 
present and discuss degree of formalization. 
2.4.1. Basic Contract theory 
Ian Macneil (1974, p. 696), the well-known father of relational contracts, describes four 
essentials or foundations (“primal roots of Contract”) upon which a contract is based1
                                                 
1 There is also a fifth root, language, but it is considered given. 
. 
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1) Specialization of Labor and Exchange 
MacNeil (1974) points to that primary needs forces conscious human beings to exchange 
in a world of specialized labor.  This makes co-ordination of economic decisions 
necessary, and can be done through the mechanism of the market or within the 
organization (Douma and Schreuder, 1992). 
2) Sense of Choice 
Freedom of will and the ability to choose from a range of alternatives are required to 
obtain a competitive market.   
3) Conscious Awareness of Past, Present and Future 
Here MacNeil (1974) points to that people must know the past and present in order to 
describe and know what will happen in the future.  This is the time element of the primal 
roots as will be discussed later. The time element plays an essential part in choice of 
contract strategy and format. 
4) The Social Matrix 
The above “roots” of contract cannot be established in a vacuum, only in a social 
context.  Without a social context there is no need for a contract. 
With this in mind, we can look at possible definitions of a contract.  There are several 
definitions available, some are more precise than other.  What often distinguishes the various 
definitions is the focus of the author(s) and his/her school/background.  A few definitions are 
listed below: 
 A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a 
 remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.   
American Law Institute, 1981, (§ 1) 
Or;  A contract is a formal agreement between two parties wherein one party (the 
  contractor) obligates itself to perform a service and the other party (the client) 
  obligates itself to do something in return, usually in the form of payment to 
  contractor. 
        Gray and Larson, 2006, (p.405) 
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Or;   …..the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into the 
  future. 
        MacNeil, 1980 (p.36) 
It is not the intent to provide or agree on one definition, but to show the width of definition 
available for “Contract”. 
2.4.2. Discrete Contracts and Contractual Relations 
Ian Macneil (1980, p. 10) defines a discrete contract as “one in which no relation exists 
between the parties apart from the simple exchange of goods”.  At the same time, Macneil 
(1980) states that there are however practically no contracts without any kind of relations, 
and in some cases these relations exist apart from the exchange of goods itself.  Eisenberg 
(2000, p. 816) goes as far as saying that: ”discrete contracts are almost as imaginary as 
unicorns”.  The use of discrete contracts is however theoretically important to understand the 
ultimate range of contracts. 
To further explain the differences between discrete and relational contracts I have chosen to 
base this on Ian MacNeil’s approach to the same in one of his most famous works, “The New 
Social Contract” from 1980.  However, I have modified the structure somewhat to avoid 
having to continuously point back to the various elements that is to be discussed.  In addition, 
MacNeil (1980, p. 10) distinguishes between primitive and modern relations, where primitive 
relations “exist in a community that has the characteristics of having an independent 
economy with relatively little specialization, relative stability and little fundamental change”.  
I have chosen to eliminate this part of the analysis due to its limited relevance to the research 
questions and also the scope of a master thesis.   
He defines modern relations as follows:  
[Modern relations] exist in a community that has the characteristics of being fully 
interconnected with a larger society of great complexity, involving elaborate 
specialization, and subject to constant change.   
       (MacNeil, 1980, p.  10):  
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The analysis is based on the following assumptions 1) a means of communications between 
the parties exist, 2) a system of order is established to prevent chaos, 3) a money system is in 
place and 4) a scheme to enforce promises is present (MacNeil, 1980). 
There are a few challenges with the above, such as 1) humans will tend to think both discrete 
and relational at the same time, and 2) a discrete transaction will by definition only affect a 
minor part of a society while MacNeil compares this to the entire society (MacNeil, 1980).   
There are also somewhat unusual approaches or assumptions analyzing modern contractual 
relations.  Due to the extreme specialization, the relations are very diverse in these modern 
communities, and people may ask whether all this can be gathered into the same analysis.  
With a little exception regarding smaller and larger contractual relations MacNeil is however 
firm that it does make sense, and that focusing on these somewhat unrealistic parameters may 
still be a good way to start understanding the theory of relational contracts (MacNeil, 1980).   
The analysis is based on twelve factors.   
(1) Personal Relations.  The theory of relational contracting deems personal relations as 
primary relations (MacNeil, 1980).  Primary relations are characterized by 1) 
participants interacting as distinctive and whole individuals, allowing the presence of 
feelings in the interaction, 2) profound and extensive communication and 3) 
significant elements of non-economical personal satisfaction, due to possibilities of 
personal development (MacNeil, 1974).  Primary personal relations are a key 
characteristic for modern contractual relations, and a picture that is often used is the 
marriage or employment relations (MacNeil, 1974, 1980).  In primary relations, the 
individuals are recognized for who they are and not as a means for exchanging goods 
and services. 
On the other hand, you have the discrete transactions which are non-primary relations.  
These are limited in scope or limited to specific topics, they are transferrable and not 
unique, the communication is limited and not meant to disclose any personal details,  
and they are often public and usually formal (if verbal communications take place at 
all).  The communication is not the primary focus, but rather the exchange of goods or 
services (MacNeil, 1974, 1980).   
(2) Number of parties involved.   While “the ideal discrete transaction only has two 
parties” (MacNeil, 1980, p.  13) you will find that a large amount of people is often 
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involved when it comes to modern contractual relations.  These relations may also last 
for a very long time.  New people are added, while others leave, however the relations 
still continues (MacNeil, 1974).  Increased number of participants will also naturally 
increase the number and complexity of primary relations (MacNeil, 1980 and 
Kolltveit and Reve, 2002).   
(3) Measurement and Specificity. In a discrete transaction, such as buying a Coke-a-Cola 
at a gas station, the product will be going one way and the equal in value of money 
going the other way (payment).  Under modern contractual relations it will be found 
that careful measurement of money on one side and goods and services on the other 
side is considered normal.  Much of this is made possible through the information 
technology available to conduct such advanced measurements.  The information 
systems actually demand these extreme levels of specification.  This leads the 
exchange under modern contractual relations to an extreme level of specificity.   
It should be noted that there are challenges related to specificity in measurement 
under modern relations.  This would include elements such as prestige and personal 
power as well as other human aspect in the social exchange.  These are, to a certain 
degree immeasurable (MacNeil, 1974). 
(4) Sources of contractual solidarity.  At a minimum, contractual solidarity is the element 
that makes two parties choosing mutual exchange over killing and steeling from one 
another.  However, in a discrete transaction, except for these basic social 
requirements, no such solidarity exists apart from the immediate gains each party has 
from the exchange itself (MacNeil, 1980).  For contractual relations the source for 
contractual solidarity is found in the current and future relation.  The internal support 
that is generated in a contractual relationship, but remote or non-existing in the 
discrete transaction, is one of the most important distinctions between these two types 
of exchanges (MacNeil, 1974). 
(5) Commencement, duration and termination.  A discrete transaction is, as earlier 
discussed, identified by short duration between payment and consumption/ 
performance, and “agreement is accomplished within the minimum length of contact 
between the parties” (MacNeil, 1974, p. 748).  A discrete transaction has also a clear 
commencement and termination and MacNeil (1974, p. 750) refers to it as “Sharp in, 
sharp out”.  This is vastly different from modern contractual relations where there is 
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no clear commencement or termination.  Most people would agree that signing an 
agreement or termination of an agreement could constitute clear cuts, but MacNeil’s 
(1974) point is that there are elements leading up to each of these events that makes 
this milestone less defined.  For the sake of commencement, there almost always will 
be activities and events leading up to signing of agreements.  For termination, similar 
conclusions can be drawn.  As opposed to discrete transaction, modern relations may 
have a very long duration that commenced a long time ago and where termination is 
an undefined time in the future.  Elements and participants in the relationship will 
come and go throughout this time, but the relations continue (MacNeil, 1980).   
(6) Planning.  The complexity and importance of planning is evident when looking at the 
amount of space provided for this subject in both “Many Futures of Contracts” 
(MacNeil, 1974) and “The New Social Contract” (MacNeil, 1980).  As in MacNeil’s 
works, additional space is provided for planning below. 
Planning activities for a discrete transaction is “complete and specific and binding.” 
(MacNeil, 1980, p.  16) Reciprocal blessings are obtained early, and assumed whole.  
Looking at modern contractual relations, they’re planned in gauged and explicit terms 
(MacNeil, 1980).  To go into further detail, and also to portray the differences, a 
direct comparison between discrete transaction and modern contractual relations will 
be made, highlighting the following five elements; (a) primary focus,  (b) 
completeness and specificity, (c) tacit assumptions (d) sources and form, and (e) 
bindingness.   
(a) Primary Focus.  Discrete transactions are all about the core of the exchange, 
money, or price, in one hand and goods and services in the other.  Planning is 
therefore also focused towards this.  There may be some related process planning 
in the form of agreeing on regulation handling issues with the transaction, but then 
this is more included as a necessity or requirement, and does not constitute the 
primary focus.   
The same focus on substance can be found under some modern contractual 
relations but only when the actual exchange is taking place at time of planning.  
While this is not the case the primary focus will be on the structures and process 
to govern future exchange and distribution of power (MacNeil, 1974). 
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(b) Completeness and Specificity. As mentioned above, planning in discrete contracts 
are considered whole, specific and complete at the time of transaction, at least in 
theory. In practice there is also an element of the unforeseen that cannot be taken 
into account at the time of the transaction.  Planning in modern contractual 
relations is not complete.  There will always be elements of tentativeness due to 
the nature of relations, as they change, grow and develop.  The effect of this may 
often be that it is not possible to obtain the degree of specificity and completeness 
desired. 
MacNeil (1974) also points out that as markets have become more complex, so 
have the requirements for planning.  This has led to relations being a more 
dominant form of economic activity and planning in our society.  “Transactions 
alone cannot serve adequately the planning need of a technologically complex 
and heavily capitalized society.” (MacNeil, 1974, p. 763).  Discrete transactions 
simply don’t have the required capacities to take account for the growth and 
change that relations can, especially in the presence of bounded rationality, and 
limited ability to predict the future. 
(c) Tacit Assumptions.  MacNeil (1974) references Fuller and Eisenberg (1972) when 
discussing tacit assumption, characterizing this as something unspoken, which is 
taken for granted by one or several parties.  There is no room for such 
assumptions in the discrete transaction, but they play a vital role in modern 
contractual relations, such as trust. 
(d) Sources and form.  With planning in discrete transaction, being complete and 
whole, further planning or variation appears to be unwarranted.  In relations, this 
is not the case.  Relations are, by nature characterized by heavy post 
commencement adjustments and related planning.  The planning ranges from 
being specific, to not specific at all depending on what the actual adjustment 
concerns (MacNeil, 1974). 
(e) Bindingness.  Planning in discrete transactions is as described above binding, and 
planning in modern contractual relations is in some ways the same (MacNeil, 
1980).  However, relations are often subject to change, and the parties are aware 
of this.  We often therefore see that change and its effect and distribution of 
burdens and benefits are laid out in the regulations governing the relationship. 
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This summarizes the planning section and I will move on to cover the remaining five 
elements. 
(7) Future Cooperation.  A discrete transaction ends upon payment and it has limited to 
no relational dimension.  There is therefore no requirement or desire for future 
cooperation (MacNeil, 1980).  In a contractual relation however, a need for future 
cooperation does exist and may to some degree be a prerequisite for a trade to even 
occur in the first place (Kolltveit and Reve, 2002).  Future cooperation is not only 
required to perform the planned activities, but also for future planning.  Continuous 
iterative planning after signing of contract is a key characteristic for relations 
(MacNeil, 1974). 
(8) Sharing and dividing benefits and burdens.  In a discrete transaction, there is no 
sharing of benefits and/or burdens; it is all created or left with the individual parties.  
In modern contractual relations there will be clear separation of benefits and burdens, 
but at the same time there will also be sharing (MacNeil, 1980). 
(9) Obligations.  MacNeil (1980) claims that obligations assumed differs in three ways: 
“sources of content, sources of obligation and specificity” (p. 17).  For a discrete 
transaction the content originates from the assurances provided during the transaction, 
i.e. clearly expressed and communicated promises (MacNeil, 1974), while the 
obligation comes from oneanother’s instinct or push to oblige.  This leads to greater 
specificity compared to the contractual relations where both content and obligations 
are sourced out of the relation itself.  This is also true for modern contractual 
relations.  When it comes to content, MacNeil (1980) points to obligations that come 
from promises made and from the relation itself.  Sources of obligations come from 
both the relation itself, but also from the external society. 
(10) Transferability.  MacNeil (1980) writes that trade forms wealth and therefore trade  
will happen unless something hinders it.  From this, you may derive that the transfer 
of rights and obligations in a discrete transaction will occur.  The only exception to 
this is the responsibility for lack of performance.  Looking into modern contractual 
relations it is found that non-transferability is often the case in smaller contractual 
relations, meaning relations with individual A just is not the same as relations with 
individual B.  However, when one studies larger modern contractual relations, the 
individual focuses loose importance and is replaced by business relations that may be 
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transferred between legal entities.  This may impact those involved, but the relations 
are still transferrable (MacNeil, 1980). 
(11) Attitudes. MacNeil (1980) divides this section about attitudes toward the transaction 
or relation into four subjects; (a) awareness of conflict of interest, (b) unity, (c) time 
and (d) expectations about trouble. 
a) Awareness of conflict of interest.  With the low presence of long term relations in 
a discrete transaction, and the fact that these types of transactions have zero-sum 
aspects, you will find that the parties are self-focused with an intention to 
maximize their own utility.  Under long term modern contractual relations, the 
focus is not so individualistic, but more on cohesive and cooperative aspects 
which thereby lower the potential risk for conflict of interest.  Also, if such 
conflict should occur, there will be actions taken to control this (MacNeil, 1980). 
There will be a higher degree of planning, more comprehensive measurement of 
performance and a relatively clear distribution of burdens and benefits.  All these 
elements contribute to a greater awareness of conflict of interest under modern 
contractual relations (MacNeil, 1980). 
b) Unity.   As it has become clearer throughout this elaboration on discrete 
transaction and contractual relations no unity exists under a discrete transaction.  
It was shown earlier that the need for future cooperation is one characteristic of 
modern contractual relations.  This need, by default, calls for greater unity under 
these types of relations.  In general, interdependence between i.e. two companies, 
creates a sense of unity.  Also, the awareness around conflict of interest is actually 
one of the main contributing factors to greater unity under modern contractual 
relations (MacNeil, 1980). 
c) Time.  As stated above, in a discrete transaction, planning is complete at the time 
of commencement.  The only way to achieve this is to bring the past and the 
future into the present (MacNeil, 1974).  This is what MacNeil refers to as 
presentiation, which is a key element in most of his work on this subject.  Under 
modern contractual relations some elements are considered presentiated and 
others not.  Parts of the relation may be planned and measured in such a detailed 
way that they are to be considered to have occurred long before it they have.  On 
the other side, two parties may build framework for how to deal with certain 
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issues should they come up in the future, i.e. arbitration regulations.  Presentiated 
or not, under modern contractual relations, the parties are always aware that things 
may change in the future for the better or worse for each of the parties (MacNeil, 
1974) and therefore make contractual provisions to accommodate this. 
d) Trouble.   The nature of a discrete transaction; the planning that is complete, or 
the presentiation, assumes that trouble would be non-existing, or at least taken into 
account for in the pricing agreed to (MacNeil, 1974).  In a modern relation, 
trouble is a part of life and expected to occur.  However, today’s planning 
capabilities enables extensive planning to be conducted when trouble arises 
(MacNeil, 1974). 
(12) Power, Hierarchy, and Command.   MacNeil (1980) is with Power referring to the 
ability to influence others, even if they don’t want it to.  He mentions that it is the 
relative balance in power between two parties that creates the ability to command and 
create formal and informal hierarchies.  One of the keys in this balance is dependence, 
which correlates negatively with increased power.  MacNeil (1980) uses a worker as 
an example and how his negotiation power towards his employer shifts upward when 
being in a union, meaning he is less dependent. 
Referencing a purchase of bad meat over the counter, MacNeil (1980) points to the 
unilateral power that exists in discrete transactions between the time of purchase and 
consumption.  This is independent of the theoretical removal of power due to 
presentiation. 
The balance of dependence in contractual relations is not a static phenomenon which 
is assumed in a discrete transaction, but rather dynamic.  Power relations shift as a 
project progresses coupled with shifting dependence due to internal hierarchies and 
commands.  This makes power a substantial attribute under contractual relations 
(MacNeil, 1974). 
After focusing on the various characteristics of the discrete transactions and 
contractual relations, I will now focus on norms and behaviors under these extremes 
to further characterize contractual relations. 
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2.4.3. Contractual Norms 
Barthelemy and Quentin (2006) state that there is a formal side and an informal side 
to an exchange.  The formal side is represented by the contract and the informal side 
is represented by relational norms and trust.   
Due to incompleteness of most contracts, norms have the potential to be alternative 
and complimentary governance mechanism of the relation (Sunde, 2007).  
Understanding norms and their implication on governance is important as it relates to 
establishment of governance structures that 1) are effective and efficient, 2) 
safeguards the exchange and 3) maximizes the benefits of the involved parties 
(Cannon et al, 2000). 
Contract norms can be presented in a many ways, but also here I choose to base this 
on MacNeil’s “The New Social Contract” from 1980.  There are other sources 
available, i.e. Kolltveit and Reve, (2002), but they appear to base their findings off 
MacNeil’s work as well.  MacNeil still focuses on the differences between discrete 
contracts and contractual relations.  This adds value to the exercise of mapping and 
explaining what relational contract theory is while also describing what it is and what 
it is not. 
First I will present norms that are common for all contracts, then later present what is 
specific for relational contracts.  I have chosen not to elaborate further on norms 
specific for discrete transaction as that is not the primary focus of this thesis. 
2.4.3.1. Common Norms 
MacNeil (1980) divides the common norms in nine segments 
1) Role Integrity – Northcraft and Neal (1994, p. 236) says that “roles define the set 
of behaviors appropriate to particular positions occupied by individuals in a 
group.  Roles also specify the authority relationships within a group, including 
who has the right to call meetings, set agendas, and assign tasks to group 
members.  Looking at discrete transactions alone, you may question if roles are 
applicable, however, as we have seen earlier, this is a zero-sum “game” area 
where isolated profit maximization is the focus for each party.  The role as a 
negotiator or trader is therefore very important.   
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To limit the scope of this rather comprehensive subject we can focus on 
consistency, conflict and complexity (MacNeil, 1980): 
A role must be consistent in many different ways to earn some credibility amongst 
other people, and this credibility is based on law or predefined preferences and 
opinions in the public, or even closer, as in a contractual relationship.  The 
credibility or role as the environmentalist does not fit well together with a job in a 
polluting industry (unless his position is to improve the environmental footprint).  
Similarly, there are often only a number of hats or roles you can hold in a given 
situation, and some of these hats or roles may not be held at the same time due to 
ethical dilemmas (MacNeil, 1980). 
We touched upon role conflict earlier, and will touch upon it again under contract 
solidarity.  Even though the subject or role conflict is much greater than contract 
solidarity alone we will limit it to say that the norm would be to solve these based 
on references, that being in the contractual relationship alone, references outside 
the contractual relationship, through arbitration or the law (MacNeil, 1980). 
The complexity of role integrity may be traced back to the previous paragraph 
about potential conflicts.  Specialization has led to very complex work tasks, and 
professionals holding these positions interact with other professionals and/or the 
public.  This may often lead to conflict as people are complex organisms.  Conflict 
is however not necessarily a bad thing, actually quite the contrary, especially if it 
is not destructive (MacNeil, 1980). 
2) Mutuality – This norm basically points out that a party will not voluntarily trade or 
enter into an exchange unless the party’s utility is increased after the trade.  It does 
not promise that the each party will benefit at the same level, but calls for some 
kind of evenness, especially for a relationship to exist.  The norm also says that 
the presence of valid alternatives, as a competitive market, will limit an uneven 
exchange, and similarly, if this is not achievable, someone will eventually quit 
(MacNeil, 1980).  This may be traced back to Michael Porter (1980) and his 
theory about the five competitive forces. 
3) Implementation of Planning – We have earlier spent significant space discussing 
planning, so only a few elements are mentioned here.  We saw that planning under 
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discrete contracts is limited, but under contractual relations it is essential.  When 
we are referencing planning as a contract norm, it is the implementation of such 
planning that is the essential, especially for larger complex projects (MacNeil, 
1980).   
4) Effectuation of Consent – Under this norm, MacNeil (1980) discusses the lost 
opportunities by making a choice.  Basically, if a company chooses to buy a 
product from one supplier, he is at the same time saying no to all other alternatives 
out there.  He references contract remedies in case of unfulfilled obligations, but 
these may often not add up to, or make up for the losses incurred by the choice 
made and following default performance. 
MacNeil (1980) further claims that remedies and consequences of entering into a 
contract is often unknown to the parties, and that an agreement is therefore is only 
reached exactly because of this or because the important parts of the contracts 
remains optional.  Going the former route requires an immense amount of 
planning and implementation of such to effectuate consent.  Going the latter route 
raises the importance of to what parts consent is given and how to deal with the 
remaining parts.  This choice to provide consent is essential, as a common norm of 
contract, and will remain so unless superseded by a centralized administrative 
enforcing body. 
5) Flexibility - Bounded rationality holds, as discussed earlier, that humans intend to 
act rationally, but have limited ability to do so (Williamson, 1985).  This triggers 
the need to plan for such human limitations in the way providing flexibility for the 
parties.  This can be done in several ways, but for discrete transactions, its 
characteristics (limited personal relations, short duration, limited future 
cooperation to mention a few), makes it somewhat unsuitable for a process change 
(internal).  This leaves us with an external option, which can limit the scope of the 
transaction.  For contractual relations, this is quite different as one has ongoing 
interpersonal relations of long duration.  This indicates the possibility of 
adjustments and amendments within the relation as time evolves and unpredicted 
events occur (MacNeil, 1980). 
6) Contractual Solidarity – We earlier touched upon sources of contractual solidarity 
and saw that for discrete transaction this solidarity comes from external sources.  
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For modern contractual relations, contract solidarity is sourced both internally and 
externally as well, but more distinguishable.  For the purposes of contract norms it 
suffices to say that no exchange is possible without the presence of this norm 
(MacNeil, 1980). 
7) The Linking Norms: Restitution, Reliance and Expectation Interests - Restitution 
interests here refer to someone who takes advantage of a transaction and breaks a 
promise.  Under contractual relations, the restitution interest may come into play 
when a party is receiving a part that is too large of the total value that is created by 
an exchange (MacNeil, 1980). 
Similarly, the reliance interest refers to non promissory aspects of the relations, 
where i.e. an employee may rely on the employer to provide insurance in the 
absence of social security (in an American system) just because he works there.  
This may or may not in fact be true. 
The expectation interest refers to what has been promised.   
An important aspect of these linking norms is that they link (hence the name) the 
other norms together, as illustrated in figure 1.  You can for example easily see 
how role integrity and planning may be linked through restitution and reliance 
interests, or for example between planning and consent.  At the same time that 
mutuality and restitution goes hand in hand and that these linking norms are 
linked to flexibility under contractual relations is easily observed (MacNeil, 
1980).   
A second reason they are called “linking” norms is because they link the other 
norms to defined rules and regulations that two parties may have agreed to obey 
under a contract. Therefore, if a party is defaulting under a contract there may be 
predefined remedies that may be sought (MacNeil, 1980). 
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Figure 1: - Linking Norms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: From Prosjekt –organisering, ledelse og gjennomføring (2nd ed.)  p.  116, by 
B.  J.  Kolltveit and T.  Reve, 2002, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
8) Creation and Restraint of Power – Power can be created in many different ways, 
but is undisputedly created or inherent through trade itself (MacNeil, 1980). 
Signing an agreement changes the distribution of power. 
On the other side you have a restraint of power which is obvious when studying 
the remedies available under law for breach of contract.  The modern society 
limits these, and for specific reasons, which are found under the other contract 
norms.  An unlimited shift of power will eventually destroy the mutuality under 
the contract, and without mutuality the relationship may not survive.  We also 
touched upon bounded rationality referencing the impossible task of foreseeing all 
possible occurrences under the contract.  It is also therefore important for the 
parties that there may be only a limited shift of power.  An unlimited shift would 
often prevent the parties to reach consent, holding the other norms firm.   
In summary, we see that the power is created through trade, and at the same time 
is restrained. This applies both for discrete transactions and contractual relations. 
9) Harmonization with the social matrix – We earlier touched on the primal roots of 
contract, and MacNeil’s (1974) fourth root was the social context under which one 
places an agreement.  This contract norm states that the contract must be aligned 
with the society in which it applies.  Some of the norms that form a society are     
global, and some are local, or even governed by the relationship.   
Norm 1 Norm 2 Norm 3 
Linking Norms 
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Harmonization with the social matrix is just as important for discrete transactions 
as for contractual relations, but it may be viewed differently.  There is no room for 
customizing the discrete transaction to the various norms of the society.  It is 
therefore given that these norms govern the way discrete transactions are 
conducted in a given society, also making it clear to the participants what is 
allowed and what is not.  Still, a full harmonization is only possible if the discrete 
transaction is conducted in its original way – through immediate self-interest 
maximization.  Similarly, for contractual relations, a full harmonization can only 
occur under full compliance or alignment with applicable norms in the society and 
where the parties operate at their full extent within these (MacNeil, 1980). 
2.4.3.2. The Relational Norms 
The norms referred to as relational norms are a somewhat intensification of the 
common norms, with specific focus on role integrity, contractual solidarity and 
harmonization with the social matrix.  “Relational norms are particularly useful for 
safeguarding investments and facilitating supplier commitment, because they motivate 
the supplier to behave in a way that would be beneficial to the relationship as a whole 
and thus preserve the relationship” (Jap and Ganesan, 2000, p. 241). 
1) Role Integrity – Role integrity under discrete transactions are relatively simple and 
exercised under a rigid set of rules and regulations.  Under contractual relations 
you will operate under the same ultimate regulations (the law), but on a more 
operational level dealing with elements such as habits, customs, internal rules, 
expectations and so forth.  Also, contractual relations are dynamic and you will 
have norms and roles that change throughout the relationship.  This complicates 
the norm significantly compared to discrete transactions, but makes it equally 
more important.  Maintaining role integrity becomes an experiment of social 
engineering and essential when operating under contractual relations. 
2) Preservation of the Relation – This norm is an intensification of the norm of 
contractual solidarity.  A discrete transaction has a “sharp in – sharp out” element 
as discussed earlier, but the contractual relations has a long duration which 
necessitates a preservation of the relation.  This applies individually as well as 
collectively. 
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Kolltveit and Reve (2006) further elaborate that participants in such relations must 
work at all time as if there may be future opportunities as a result of the work they 
are performing currently.  This necessitates focus on the other norms such as 
reliance, mutuality and restitution, and the parties will have to cooperate to make 
this work. 
Brynhildsvoll (2005) elaborates on some of this same topic, as he discusses the 
differences between a relational - and a transaction based regime.  He mentions 
that in a transaction based regime you would replace the contractor to improve 
while in a relation based regime you would work as a team with the existing 
contractor to improve. 
3) Harmonization of Relational Conflict – This norm may be evident, but 
nevertheless crucial for a relationship.  Harmonization of conflicts in relationships 
is essential, and without it, trust is jeopardized and the relationship will eventually 
seize to exist. 
Harmonization is also very important in case of conflict between the relation itself 
and the external social matrix.  By ignoring this conflict, the parties may come in 
to a situation where the social pressure becomes so intense that change is 
necessary or to the extreme of where it is no longer feasible to operate.  The scope 
of how to overcome this is beyond the objectives of this thesis.   
2.4.3.3. Norm Development 
Dwyer, Shurr and Oh discuss amongst other things development of norms in their work on 
Developing Byer-Seller Relationships from 1987.  Referencing Scanzoni (1979), they 
describe a relationship development process divided into five phases, 1) awareness, 2) 
exploration, 3) expansion, 4) commitment and 5) dissolution (Dwyer et.al 1987).  After the 
first phase of identification, and acknowledgement of the other party as a possible business 
partner, Dwyer et.al (1987) points to the exploration phase as the phase for development of 
the norms symptomatic for the relational contract.  This development starts as soon as there is 
exchange of information between the parties with initial focus on establishing norms and 
standards for behavior.  According to Jap and Ganesan (2000), relational norms are however 
not very effective in this phase, because they are not well developed. 
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After this, norms for future exchange are targeted, with trust identified as possibly the most 
important (Jap and Ganesan, 2000).  In these start up phases the written contracts may have 
dysfunctional  consequences due to their limited flexibility compared to relational norms (Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000 and Macalay 1963).  At the same time implicit understanding and 
relational norms are developing to the degree that they may no longer be in line with the 
written contract that was signed at the start of the relationship (Helper and Levine, 1992). 
Entering the expansion phase, the partners become more interdependent as they harvest 
benefits from the cooperation.  Following this, the parties are ready take on more risk and the 
interdependence increases further.  Casciaro (2003) advocates that as a relationship evolves, 
the uncertainty and complexity decrease and the potential for development of trust and 
relational norms increases.  He further emphasizes that, due to this, it is important to take 
necessary time to establish these relational exchanges. 
The commitment phase represents the time where the parties are not actively seeking 
alternative business relationships, but are enjoying the benefits of the current one.  
Preservation of the relationship is obtained through continuous benefits and an exchange 
effectiveness that comes from trust (Dwyer et.al 1987). 
Business relationships in the decline/dissolution phase are often characterized by a lack of 
trust.  You typically see that both the client and the supplier are focused on protecting their 
investments and gaining maximum individual benefits from the relationship instead of the 
joint benefits seen earlier. Reverting to the written contract will in this phase increase the 
commitment and possible prevent a very quick dissolution of the relationship (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000). 
Jap and Ganesan (2000) also write that relational norms are particularly important during the 
transition phases when building the relationship and when it is dissolving.  Relational norms 
can often work as emotional and procedural buffers that can reduce the stress associated with 
the rapid change in these phases  
This summarizes the contract norms section. 
2.4.4. Contract types 
We have spent a significant amount of time elaborating on the differences between discrete 
and relational contracts, and also informal more abstract differences in form of norms.  We 
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also explained that these are the more extreme contract types.  This section can partially be 
considered a summary of discrete and relational contracts, but it also presents a new contract 
type, and place the contract types in a system.  The three contract types discussed by MacNeil 
(1974, 1978 and 1980) and Williamsons’ (1985) are:  
• Classic Contracts 
• Neo-Classic Contracts 
• Relational Contract 
In addition to the contract types above I have also briefly touched on alliance contracting, 
which is currently becoming more popular. 
2.4.4.1. Classic Contracts 
Classic contracts are discrete contracts, but additional information is worth mentioning in this 
context.   
The classic contract is the most extreme discrete contract (strict purchase) in which 
presentiation and discreteness are the two main factors (MacNeil, 1978). 
In order to ensure discreteness, the identity of the parties to a transaction is treated as 
irrelevant (MacNeil, 1978).  This means that there are limited or no personal relations, and 
that the parties themselves have limited influence on the transaction.  Williamson (1985) 
references Telser and Higinbotham (1977) in exemplifying this when referring to the 
organized market in which the participants trade standardized contracts and where one unit 
perfectly trades another unit.  In this case, the parties of the contract do not influence the 
terms of the exchange.   
To further enhance discreteness, only limited contract remedies are available (MacNeil, 
1978).  They are relatively predictable so that the parties will know the effect of under-
performance or non-performance.  They are also limited in exposure.  This limitation 
provides the parties a possibility to fully calculate its total exposure prior to entering the 
agreement (MacNeil, 1974). 
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A third element regarding the discreteness is the clear boundaries of being in or not being in 
the transaction.  One is either in with the full responsibility that it takes, or they are not in at 
all (MacNeil, 1978). 
Lastly, the introduction of third parties are discouraged as too many parties or “poles of 
interests” may create relations that can be damaging to the discreteness.   
These elements that enhance discreteness also directly enhance the presentiation as you are 
able to delimitate various aspect of the transaction.  There are however other aspects of the 
classic contract law that focuses more specifically on presentation, such as; providing 
predictable terms and conditions to deal with all aspects of the transaction and remedies on 
expectation to ensure that the non-breaching party gets what it intended when signing the 
contract. 
Williamson (1985) summarizes the classic contract as follows: 
o the parties to the transaction are treated as irrelevant 
o  the nature of the agreement is carefully delimited 
o  the remedies are narrowly prescribed – with this Williamson references 
limited remedies without much room for interpretation 
o third party participation is discouraged 
2.4.4.2. Neo Classic Contracts 
The dynamic reality of today’s business may require other types of transactions than those 
suited for the classic contract scheme as described above.  This applies very much for longer 
term agreements that are executed under high uncertainty, making presentiation close to 
impossible at least within the limits of feasibility (MacNeil, 1978 and Williamson, 1985).  
Consequently, contracts have been written to include a wider range of techniques and 
processes to take account for future change rather than leaving open gaps or extensive 
planning for full presentiation.  It is however, important to point out that the neoclassical 
contracts have a classical inheritance, and that neoclassical contracts therefore are poised 
with some of the same limitations we see under classical contracts (MacNeil, 1978). 
In light of the potential insufficiencies of the classical contracting regime three alternatives 
arise: First, we can eliminate such transactions, second, we can remove such transactions 
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from the open marketplace and instead organize them internally.  The transaction can then be 
executed and decisions can be made in a predefined hierarchic structure, with agreed- upon 
control systems while under common and united ownership.  And third, we can take into use 
a different contracting approach that facilitates for stronger relations and additional 
governance mechanisms, which is what MacNeil refers to as neoclassical contracting 
(Williamson, 1985). 
The need for stronger relations and additional governance mechanisms are necessary to 
facilitate the gap in planning and need for greater flexibility that arises when full 
presentiation is not possible (MacNeil, 1978).  Examples of how to facilitate this may be 
(ibid): 
(1) Use of standards for future price escalation, i.e.  Consumer/ Steel Price Indexes 
(2) Use of third party definition of performance, i.e. someone representing an industry 
acknowledged standard, or even an arbitrator.  An important point that MacNeil 
makes about arbitration is that there is ground to believe that litigation (as would 
be normal under classic contracts) would more often lead to a termination of a 
contract rather than going through arbitration.  Planning for arbitration will 
therefore often be a more flexible solution than a litigation 
(3) Use of “one-party control of terms”, i.e. implementing one party’s right to 
exercise an option under the contract. 
In addition to the above, some post commencement planning is required, especially in 
connection with contract adjustments (MacNeil, 1978).   
By this point, it is obvious that this type of contract is characterized by an acknowledgement 
that the world is complex, that contracts are incomplete and that flexible settlement system 
are important (Williamson, 1985).  These longer term agreements make the relational part 
even more important as well as the element of trust.  In addition there is the importance of 
vendor selection and administration as work will take part in the future.  These conditions 
obviously increase the transaction costs making this approach more suitable for complex 
agreement rather than simple transactions (Kolltveit and Reve, 2006). 
Feinman states the following when he describes the neoclassical law and method, and 
compares it to the classical law;  
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The scope of neoclassical law is residual and fragmented.  There is still a unitary 
principle of contract principles (the rules of formation, validation, performance and 
remedies), but the law is residual in that it no longer attempts to encompass all 
consensual transactions…….Neoclassical method is a mix of rules and standards.  
This is still doctrine, by and large, but it is doctrine of a much softer sort than in 
classical law. 
      (Feinman, 2000, p. 738-739) 
MacNeil (1978) is clear on his beliefs around a continuous evolvement in a relational 
direction for the neoclassical contracts, but at the same time the courts and scholars will 
continue work towards keeping it within the classical structure. 
2.4.4.3. Relational Contracts 
I have throughout this paper elaborated on various aspects of relational contracts.  In this 
section I will try to summarize the most important parts while also providing some further 
insight to relational contracting. 
Ian MacNeil’s influence on relational contracting is hard to circumvent.  His work was, 
according to Kalleberg and Reve (cited in Kolltveit and Reve, 2002, p. 125) most focused on 
employment contracts, but what is learned from these kinds of contracts are applicable for 
business related/exchange contracts which is the focus of this thesis. 
Relational contracting is an answer to a dynamic world and a realization that full 
presentiation is impossible.  Eisenberg (2000) writes that the theory behind relational 
contracting is a mirror of classic contract law.  Without full presentiation, discreteness also 
becomes problematic, and the transaction or performance becomes more dependent on the 
individual parties and the relations between them.  Personal involvement becomes the 
primary relation (MacNeil, 1974).  MacNeil (1978, p.  901) actually goes as far as writing 
that “the relation has become a mini society with a vast array of norms beyond the norms 
centered on exchange and its immediate processes.”  Eisenberg (2000, p. 816) presents his 
definition of relational contracts as “a contract that involves merely an exchange, but also a 
relationship, between the contracting parties”. 
Relational contracting is further recognized through long duration with no clear 
commencement or completion, and substantial processes and structures for planning.  
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Planning is not necessarily binding and the success of the relation is measured through the 
amount of further cooperation in both performance and further planning.  Arbitration is a 
preferred dispute resolution as it may often not be as ultimate as litigation (MacNeil, 1974).   
Personal involvement being the primary relation type necessitates a range of norms, as 
discussed earlier.  The most important norms under contractual relations are effectuation of 
consent, contractual solidarity, restitution, reliance and preservation of the relation (Kolltveit 
and Reve, 2006). 
Even though this thesis does not intend to measure effectiveness of either contract type I find 
it appropriate to bring forward some of the findings made by Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke 
(2006).  They say that despite the growing interest in relational contracting there is yet to see 
any clear situations or applications where relational contract is deemed more or less effective 
than traditional contracting. 
Also, despite the focus on the shortcomings of legal contracts from scholars like MacNeil and 
Macaulay, Rubin (1990) states that there has really been no noticeable decrease in use of 
commercial contracts, or in the length or complexity of such contracts. 
2.4.4.4. Alliance Contracting 
In addition to MacNeil’s split between classic – neoclassic and relation contracts I will also 
briefly cover alliance contracting.   
A need for greater cooperation between client and contractor, as well the importance of 
choosing the correct contractor has led to the rising of alliance contracting.  To achieve 
increased cooperation, the parties establish fully integrated project teams, which necessitate a 
new way of thinking contract (Kolltveit and Reve, 2002).  Alliance contracting is mainly used 
within complex projects where joint planning and performance is required to reach the goal.  
Revenue is according to Hetland (cited in Kolltveit and Reve, 2002, p. 127) distributed 
according to pre-defined criteria agreed to between the parties, and can be established both 
inter between contractors/suppliers or inter between both contractors/suppliers and the client. 
I have compiled the below table 2 to further structure the information and to easier visualize 
the similarities and differences between the contract types.  The information below is 
summarized on an aggregated level, and further details on classical - and relational contracts 
are provided in attachment 1. 
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Table 2 – Contract Types 
Concept Classic Contract Neoclassic Contract  Relational Contract 
Personal involvement 
(and importance of 
vendor selection) 
No personal relations.   
 
 
The parties themselves 
have limited influence on 
the transaction.   
 
 
Vendor selection not 
important. 
Formal contracts 
facilitate standard, non 
deviational operation. 
Personal relations 
important during 
change/processes not 
presentiated in the 
contract.   
Vendor selection 
important. 
Personal involvement is 
primary relations.   
 
The parties have major 
influence on outcome.   
 
 
 
Vendor selection crucial. 
Presentiation Full presentiation. Includes an 
understanding that full 
presentiation is not 
feasible and incorporates 
therefore possibilities for 
future change. 
Full understanding that 
presentiation is 
impossible.   
Primary relations will 
handle future change. 
Planning Fully binding. 
 
No post commencement 
planning. 
 
 
Complete and specific 
planning. 
Binding (no information 
available). 
Post commencement 
planning, but mostly in 
connection with contract 
variations/ amendments. 
Aims for completeness 
and specificity as far as 
feasible.   
Binding, but some 
tentativess is acceptable. 
Extensive post 
commencement planning. 
 
 
Limited completeness 
and specificity in 
planning. 
Communication Limited, formal. Significant, can be deep2 Extensive, deep. . 
Commencement and 
Termination 
Clear commencement 
and termination, sharp in 
- sharp out. 
Clear commencement 
and termination, but 
actual time of termination 
may not be known at time 
of commencement, due to 
variations and options. 
No clear commencement 
or termination, a gradual 
development. 
Duration Short term, simple 
transaction. 
Long (but limited) term, 
multiple transactions 
Long term, multiple 
transactions under 
                                                 
2 Explicit information about communication under neoclassical contract law is of limited availability, but it is reasonable to assume a 
significant, sometimes deep existence of communication due to post commencement planning and a realization that the contract is not 
complete.  
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under contract. relation. 
 
 
Number of 
participants 
Two. Most often two, but can 
be more depending on 
type of agreement. 
Can be two, but often 
several, or masses. 
Transferability Fully transferable, rather 
simple. 
Transferable, more 
complex due to relational 
element. 
Difficult and costly to 
transfer, but not 
impossible (i.e. corporate 
takeover/buyout). 
Future cooperation 
required in post-
commencement 
planning and actual 
performance 
Limited or none 
required. 
Success dependent on 
future cooperation in both 
performance and post 
commencement planning, 
however somewhat 
limited where long term 
agreements for future 
work is already in place.3
Success fully dependent 
on future cooperation in 
both performance and 
post commencement 
planning 
 
Division of burdens 
and benefits 
Clear division of burdens 
and benefits. 
Clear division of burdens 
and benefits, however 
relational aspects may 
impact distribution and 
timing of such. 
Benefits and burdens are 
shared. 
Note.   Data in column 2 and 4 adopted from “The Many Futures of Contract” by I.R. McNeil 
  (1974) Southern California Law Review, 47, 738. 
 Data in column 3 partially based on MacNeil (1974, 1978 and 1980) 
2.4.5. Application of Contract types 
The listing of the various contract types is important in order to understand the differences 
between them.  In order to further clarify where the various contracts come into use I have 
included the below Figure 2. 
 
 
                                                 
3There is limited explicit information available concerning future cooperation’s impact on performance and 
future planning under neoclassical contract law. However, I consider it implied by MacNeil (1978) that future 
interaction between the parties i.e. in form of further work drives performance and post commencement 
planning   
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Figure 2: Contracts, Relations and Complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  From Prosjekt –organisering, ledelse og gjennomføring (2nd ed.)  p.  135, by B.  J.  
Kolltveit and T.  Reve, 2002, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
This figure clearly shows how the classic contract is of lowest complexity and has low 
relational aspects.  Realizing that we are living in a complex dynamic world where 
adjustments may be necessary in the future are some of the factors that lead us to Neo Classic 
Contracting.  Many applications require long standing relationships for complex deliveries or 
superior performance.  This moves relational contracting higher and further to the right in the 
figure.  At last we have alliance contracting which we said could be fully integrated project 
teams (high level of personal relations) for complex projects.  This is as relational and 
complex as it gets and is displayed in the very top right corner. 
When discussing contract types it may appear that an organization is left with one or the other 
contract types, meaning that the contract types are substitutes.  Poppo, L and Todd Zenger 
(2002) describe in a study of information exchange how relational governance often has been 
viewed as a substitute to the more traditional classic/neo-classic formal contract.  The 
traditional contract has in fact been understood to undermine trust, and thereby increase the 
chance for opportunistic behavior which they per default were constructed to prevent.  Poppo 
and Zenger (2002) describe how these traditional contracts can work in harmony with a 
relational governance and work as compliments rather than substitutes.  The study shows how 
managers have a tendency to use relational norms more heavily as the contracts are becoming 
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more complex (presence of asset specificity, uncertainty and difficulty in measuring 
performance), and at the same time, customizes the contracts to a greater extent as the 
relational governance is being developed.  In contrast to formalized contracts, relational 
governance facilitates the flexibility, solidarity and information exchange needed to manage 
the contractual relationships in a dynamic environment. 
2.4.6. Degree of Formalization 
The different contract types, from classic to alliance contracting have as shown various 
properties that make them suitable for a range of applications.  One of the properties that 
distinguishes these contracts and is the basis for much of the research in this thesis is the 
degree of formalization, which needs some further clarification and definition. 
The degree or level of formalization is previously visited by several authors, however there 
appears to be no consistent definition of the term.  Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) attempted to 
measure the degree of formalization through the amount of customization and legal work 
required to establish a contract.  Marcolin’s (2002) approach to contract definition was the 
detailing of the provisions in the contracts and the number or pages in the contract.  Cannon, 
Ashrol et al (2000) and Sunde (2007) discusses formalization through elements such as rules, 
procedures, standard operating procedures and dispute resolution procedures that are 
implemented in a contract.  This handles the more basic elements which are found find in 
most drilling and well services agreements today. 
In this thesis I would like to take this da definition a little further and define the level of 
formalization more specifically as to the extent a contract has provisions for the below 
elements, listed in table 3, and where a contract that has provisions for the following elements 
below is considered highly formalized: 
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Table 3 – Provisions in a highly formalized contract 
# Contract Provisions Examples 
1 Administrative Provisions and 
Definitions 
• Definition of contract terms 
• Exclusive supply 
• Who has authority to act under the contract? 
2 Contract Structure • What contract documents constitutes the contract? 
• What takes precedence in case of conflict? 
3 Performance of the Work • Minimum requirements for performance 
• Requirements for Quality Systems 
• Authority Requirements 
4 Progress of the Work • Reporting of delayed progress 
5 Variations, Cancellations and 
Suspension 
• The variation order process 
• When to cancel and when to suspend 
6 Delivery and Payment  • Delivery and transfer of ownership 
• Invoicing requirements and payment process 
7 Breach of Contract • Rectification and guarantee liability  
• Liquidated damages 
8 Force Majeure • Effects of Force Majeure 
9 Liability and Insurances • Mutual Indemnification 
• Limitation of liability 
10 Property Rights and  
Confidential Information 
• Rights to information, technology and inventions 
• Confidential information 
11 Law and dispute resolution • Governing law 
• Procedure for dispute resolution 
12 Scope of work • Area of operation/application 
• Requirements for personnel and equipment 
• Deliverables and Reporting 
13 Compensation format • Definition of rates for personnel and equipment 
• Penalties and bonuses 
• Adjustment of pricing 
• Price list 
14 Administration requirements • Requirements to Quality Management Systems 
• Requirements for Health Safety and Environment 
• Reporting routines 
15 Technical Specifications • Technical specifications to equipment to be used under the 
contract 
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This list could be made endless depending on the level of detail.  However, the above 
headlines should encompass most elements that would be applicable in a long term working 
relationship.  The list is based on Norsk Fabrikasjonskontrakt 2007, which was a cooperative 
effort between Statoil, Hydro and Norsk Industri to land a common framework for fabrication 
work for the NCS, hereinafter referred to as NCS. 
It is important to point out that formalization is not necessarily related to MacNeil’s 
presentiation (1974) even though they may pull in the same direction.  A highly formalized 
contract does not necessarily have to try to predict the future (presentiation), it could just 
have broad provisions that could deal with future occurrences. 
2.4.7. Reasons for high or low degree of formalization 
In their study of international business relationships and cross culture governance modes, 
Homburg, Cannon, Krohmer and Kiedaish (2009) elaborates on mechanisms used by 
managers around the world to manage risk.  They write that international differences in the 
use of governance mechanisms for managing uncertainty are to be expected.  They base this 
on previous research, referenced in Hofstede (1994), showing international differences in 
how to avoid uncertainty and willingness to accept risk.  They further describe that this 
impacts the choice of governance mode and that in order to minimize uncertainty they 
actively monitor the market and use formal contracts with clearly defined rules.  They find 
this to be applicable where the managers experience a higher degree of uncertainty than 
other.  This corresponds with Heide and John’s (2002) findings that more dominant or 
powerful companies actually tend to extract safeguards.  It would be the buying firm that 
would regulate use of added/less safeguards as they usually have an important influence with 
respect to governance mode.  The United States represents one of those cultures where the 
managers are less likely to avoid uncertainty; something that would indicate a lower degree 
of formalization (Homburg et.al., 2009). 
Uncertainty is a common denominator for many things that would lead to a more or less 
formalized contract.  Uncertainty is one of the dimensions of transaction cost analysis 
discussed earlier.  In addition, we have asset specificity as maybe the most importance factor, 
and frequency (Williamson, 1985).  These are all elements that could drive a more or less 
formalized contract.  Dyer (1997 p.  353) says for example; “The standard (transaction cost) 
reasoning is that as asset specificity increases, more complex governance structures (i.e.  
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more complex contracts) are required to eliminate or attenuate costly bargaining over profits 
from specialized assets”.  Aubert, Rivard and Patry (1996) says that when it comes to 
outsourcing, complex governance structures mean comprehensive agreements that features 
detailed clauses.  When MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) discuss supply chain contract 
detailing, they focus on environmental uncertainty and say that the level of a contract 
detailing should be positively correlated with environmental uncertainty.  This is close to 
what Leiblein and Miller (2003) states when saying that greater uncertainty will require 
flexible contract provisions and lead to intricate contracts. 
Another important aspect is bounded rationality and opportunism (presented earlier).  These 
two factors are very important in this matter as the presence, risk or absence of these play a 
large role in how formalized a contract is or should be, i.e use of safeguards in the contract.   
In addition to the above, or sometimes in parallel to asset specificity, Skogh (1989) says that 
the greater the business deal, the more detailed the contracts are, while Eisenhardt (1989) 
claims that the measurability of the transaction, and ability to staff task impacts the degree of 
formalization. 
2.5 Theoretical Framework – Summary and Key Points 
We have seen that the division of labor leads to specialization.  More specialization increases 
the need to exchange or to make economic transactions; however, an efficient exchange can 
only take place through co-ordination.  Transactions can be coordinated in two ways, either 
across the market or within organizations. 
In transaction cost economics the basis unit for analysis is the transaction itself, and it can 
take place across the market or within an organization.  How it is organized is a matter of 
minimizing costs, and we saw that the establishment of firms was a result of low cost of 
internal co-ordination compared to a range of market transactions, ref Coase (1937).   
Bounded rationality and opportunism are important behavioral assumptions which, together 
with the dimensions of transaction cost; asset specificity, uniqueness and frequency, forms 
the basis for choice of governance structure.  High asset specificity combined with frequency 
favors relational contracting, while standard goods of low frequency favors more spot related 
markets.   
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The difference between discrete transaction and contractual relations were described through 
the help of 12 factors and 11 norms.  Some of the most important were personal relations, 
contractual solidarity and planning. 
Further we saw that classic contracts are discrete contracts, and that neo-classical contracting 
is an answer to a more dynamic market.  Relational contracts are the frameworks for 
conducting several transactions under the same terms and conditions while understanding that 
presentiation is limited and opportunism present.  Safeguards are established to minimize risk 
exposure. 
The end was dedicated to formalization of contracts, how it can be defined and what factors 
that can trigger a low or high degree of formalization. 
This concludes the technical framework.  
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3 Two important regions for oil and gas exploration and production 
This section provides information about the characteristics of the two operating areas relevant 
for this thesis, the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) and the US Gulf of Mexico (US 
GOM) (figure 3).  Much could be written about these areas, but I have tried to limit it to what 
I considered value adding information for this thesis. 
Figure 3 – NCS and the US Gulf of Mexico 
 
Note.  Adapted From World Map Image with Flags (date unknown) Google. 
3.1 The Norwegian Continental Shelf 
Esso was the first operator on the NCS, and drilled the first exploration well in 1966.  They 
had to tow a drilling rig over from the US GOM as there was no industry in Norway that 
could supply the equipment required.  It was however not until 1969 that the first commercial 
find was made, by Phillips.  By 1972 there were three Norwegian oil companies; Statoil, 
Hydro and Saga Petroleum (Lerøen, 2006). 
Statoil was, through the first years, given at least a 50% share in all new leases and Statoil 
thereby quickly grew to become a dominant actor on the NCS (Lerøen, 2006).  Today Statoil, 
who merged with Hydro’s oil and gas division in 2007, has about 80% share of the oil and 
gas production on the NCS (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy).    
10 years ago there were about 10 operators on the Norwegian Continental Self(Selmer).There 
are today 41 registered operators on the NCS, however only a third of these are actively 
drilling or has operations in Norway (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate).   
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3.2 The US Gulf of Mexico 
In the US the search for oil first started onshore all the way back in 1859.  The first offshore 
well in the US GOM was however not drilled until 1947 by operator was Kerr-McGee 
(Suite101).  Operations on the shelf have grown significantly since then, and the oil 
companies keep going further and further out in the US GOM.  More than 50,000 wells have 
been drilled (O’Grady and Bagley, 2010).  Today there are about 120 active operators in the 
US GOM and this number has not changed significantly the last 10 years (Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement). 
Rig activity in US GOM has steadily decreased as can be seen in Figure 4 below.  At the time 
the Macondo incident hit there were 51 active rigs in the US GOM  (O’Grady and Bagley, 
2010).   
Figure 4 – Drilling Rig Count 
 
From: MMS Update, Place unknown, Feb 2010, Minerals Management Services   
When it comes to positions in the US GOM for 2011 Chevron has the highest activity with 
nine drilling units assigned, while BP and Apache has six each out of a total of 60 drilling 
units.  Five oil companies operates 50 % of the drilling activity for 2011 (Reddall and 
McCormic, 2011). 
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4 Research Methods  
4.1 Introduction 
In this part of the Thesis I will try to present and argue for the approach I have taken when 
conducting research related to the problem described in section 1.2.  I have listed the various 
alternatives and discussed why an exploratory design is the appropriate research design.   
4.2 Research Design 
A research design is the framework under which the research will be carried out, and it is 
usually distinguished between three different designs; exploratory, descriptive and casual 
design (Hair, Babin, Money and Samouel, 2003).    
Exploratory research design is often used when the researcher has very little information 
about the subject, and there is very limited amount of theory available to establish any kind of 
predictions.  In other words, exploratory research is often used to develop a better 
understanding of the research problem, which can later can be used for more descriptive 
research and quantitative analysis (Hair et.al., 2003). 
Descriptive research design is often used when describing the characteristics of a 
phenomenon/research question.  This kind of design aims to provide answers in who, what, 
where, which, and how questions.  It estimates the frequency or proportion and association of 
variables or it makes some specific predictions through the use of hypothesizes (Rugg & 
Gordon, 2006).  Descriptive designs are usually characterized to be of a quantitative 
character, and an example of a descriptive design can be tracking of seasonal trends by 
analyzing sales figures (Hair et.al., 2003).   
Casual research design is used to determine a causative relationship between the independent 
variable, A and the dependent variable, B (Gay, Mills and Airasian, 2006). Examples can be; 
does a highly formalized contract prevent trust among business partners? Or does a high 
market share cause less quarrelsome contractors?  
It is clear that no numbers (of significance and preciseness) will be collected and no 
hypothesizes will be developed, and therefore a casual design is not suitable.  The research 
problem does state form of causal relationships, but a causal research requires very precise 
execution which will not be met through the qualitative data collection method planned for 
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this thesis.  It is important to keep in mind that contractual data often is very sensitive, so 
unless there are public templates available, then the amount of data available will be very 
scarce.   
This thesis aims to educate the reader concerning the research questions in hope of becoming 
the basis for more detailed descriptive and/or causative research at a later stage.  Based on the 
above, an exploratory research design is determined as the best fit for this thesis.   
4.3 Data collection 
Data collection under an exploratory design is mostly conducted using literature reviews, 
focus groups, depth interviews, delphi technique or projective technique.  These are all 
qualitative methods, which according to Hellevik (1991) is characterized by having the 
researcher getting involved and aims to obtain a pattern of the impressions, instead of 
watching from the outside and measure and conduct numeric analysis (often characteristic for 
a quantitative method).  Johnson and Reynolds (2007) describe how other sources of 
empirical data can be obtained through the written record, which is composed of documents, 
reports, statistics, manuscripts, and other written, oral, or visual materials.  This is often 
referred to as document analysis.   
I will first conduct a document analysis to help answer the two first research questions 
concerning type, content and structure of the agreements. 
The second source of data is interviews.  There are several forms of interviews i.e.  
structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, and these are used in various 
applications.  Hair, et.al.  (2003) points to depth interviews as the most appropriate for an 
exploratory design, as it is often used when applied toward an area that is relatively 
unexplored.  Depth interviews are mainly unstructured.  Depth interviews are characterized 
by being one – to –one discussion between an interviewer and a respondent, and where the 
respondent is hand-picked due to his competence, knowledge or insight in a particular matter.  
Dalland (2000) underlines the need to be interactive in the interview process through use of 
nuanced descriptions and supplemental questions.  Through this approach (qualitative 
method), the researcher may to a greater extent be able to obtain an insightful understanding 
of where the respondent is coming from, and also to create those relationships that foster such 
sharing of information.  Since each interview has a tendency to be unique with limited to no 
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fixed set of questions asked of all respondents, it is typically harder to generate and analyze 
data from unstructured interviews (Trochim, 2006).   
For this project I used various sources in order to cover the span of information needed to 
answer the research questions.  I have, in an effort to simplify, presented the various sources 
in the table below.   
Table 4: Data sources 
Data 
Collection 
Method 
Source/ Subjects Background/Reasoning 
D
oc
um
en
t A
na
ly
si
s 
Statoil’s contract template 
for drilling and well 
services 
Statoil’s template is based on Norsk Fabrikasjonskontrakt for 2007, 
but with some additions to make it more appropriate for a services - 
and supply contract.  Statoil has today approximately 75 – 80% of 
the market on the NCS and this template is used for close to all 
drilling and well services contract.  As the other operators on the 
NCS only has fractions of the remaining 20-25% of the market the 
Statoil template can pretty much be used as an example for service 
contracts in use on the NCS. 
D
oc
um
en
t A
na
ly
si
s 
Three different US GOM 
service contracts for 
drilling and well services. 
There are no clear market leaders in the US GOM as we see in 
Norway with Statoil.  I have therefore chosen to base this off of 
three different agreements, and found the commonalities between 
them.  Two of these contracts are obtained from two acknowledged 
law firms in the US and represent (according to them) what you will 
see of US based contracts for drilling and well services for US 
GOM.  These law firms represent a range of clients working in the 
US GOM.  The last contract is obtained from a former independent 
oil company located in Houston.  The contract is only a few years 
old and verifies to a large extend the validity of the contracts 
obtained from the two law firms. 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
Four Service Providers 
I identified key personnel from the major service providers; 
Schlumberger, Baker Hughes and Halliburton, service companies 
representing about 75% of the market.  In addition I also 
interviewed a representative from Quail tools who provide rental 
services on a smaller scale than the majors. 
Three Oil Company 
personnel 
I interviewed three people within Statoil who has or have had roles 
as discipline advisors, procurement manager and/ or buyer.  The 
interviews were scheduled over telephone and mostly conduced 
over lunch to reduce the limited available time these individuals 
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have to none- work activities during business hours.  Interviews 
with Statoil representatives in Norway were conducted over 
telephone. 
C
on
ve
rs
at
io
ns
/ e
-m
ai
ls
 
Professional input 
Various topics of this thesis was discussed with experts in the field, 
such as:  
• Knut Kaasen with Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law 
at University in Oslo. 
• Fredrik Stang Rydin, former CPO of Hydro and signee on 
Norsk Fabrikasjonskontrakt 07  
• Group of discipline advisors for Strategic Procurement in 
Statoil.   
Communication for this group was mainly conducted over email, 
but also face to face conversations took place 
 
4.4 Validity and Reliability 
In general, empirical research on inter firm contracts/exchange is limited as such exchanges 
are subject to confidentiality and therefore hardly ever published.  For that reason some of the 
work herein is based upon templates and not actual inter firm contracts.  This limits the 
validity somewhat, but with the time and resources available, this is one of the concessions 
that had to be made.  Any person conducting research will have to weigh ideal method up 
against what is practically feasible, meaning that a thorough evaluation must be done 
concerning what method/design is best suited for the research question given the resources, 
time, experience, etc. that is available to the researcher (Halvorsen, 1996).   
Validity and reliability refers to the accuracy and consistency in the methods used to research 
the problem, in other words, we measure what are supposed to measure and that we would 
see the same results if we conducted the testing over and over again (Hair et.al., 2003).  It is 
normal to split validity into internal and external validity. 
Internal validity refers to whether a delta in an indirect variable alone can explain the delta in 
the dependent variable, or if the delta in the dependent variable actually comes from 
something outside what is being studied.  It is mostly relevant where you are trying to prove a 
causal relationship (Trochim, 1999).  I understand internal validity to be somewhat of limited 
relevance for this thesis.  I do however have one question where we search for causal 
relationships.  Whether I have been able to capture the elements, that comprise the casual 
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relationship or not, is difficult to answer, but it does at least provide for many alternatives that 
can constitute the cause.  I cannot rule out that there are variable also outside these that in this 
specific case would impact what we are setting out to measure. 
External validity relates first and foremost to generalization of the results, and the accuracy if 
doing so.  In other words, if the results of the study would be the same for different people, at 
different times, at a different place (Trochim, 2006).  As this is a qualitative study with 
unstructured interviews, and not an objective observation of a repeating activity it is by 
nature harder to generalize.  I feel however, that I have been able to either cover a decent part 
of the “population” or where this is not possible obtained expert consultation and advice on 
contracts and contract formalization.  It should however be mentioned that even though four 
representatives from the largest service companies have been interviewed it does not 
necessarily mean that the information obtained is these companies’ formal view on this 
matter. 
Reliability as described above has to do with consistency and thereby the quality of the 
measurement used (Trochim, 2006).  To describe what is in the contracts I have, instead of 
basing this on secondary sources, used actual contracts and found that to be a very good 
approach.  When starting the research, it was hard to know whether it would be sufficient, but 
after gathering and studying the information, it is consistent with only minor variation.  This 
gives confidence in the approach taken as consistency is an indicator of reliability.  The same 
applies when it comes to the interviews.  There was also really no “new” information after 
the first interview, just elaborations around the same issues and subjects.  There was also very 
limited contradicting information.  Later on, when conferring with experts in their field they 
further confirmed parts of the information obtained during the interviews, providing me with 
some confidence concerning quality of the measurement used.    
At the same time, it must be noted that the accuracy and consistency are not at a level where 
the results should be generalized. 
4.5 Ethical concerns 
There are several ethical concerns or considerations in a research project.  There are ethical 
aspects that the researcher has to deal with before, during and after collecting, interpreting 
and presenting data.  At the same time, the people providing input have responsibility that 
they provide truthful information (Hair et.al., 2003). 
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All of the above are relevant for this thesis; however the one that stands out the most is the 
ethical dilemmas of the researcher post collection of this information.  Because of my 
employment with Statoil I have had to be very clear with respondents and provider of 
information that this thesis is not in any way funded or sponsored by Statoil.  This is a 
personal project and none of the information provided is to be used for Statoil’s gain going 
forward.  This specifically relates to the contracts provided from legal firms.  Even though I 
have not been provided with the counterparts of the contract, it has been agreed with the 
providing parties that I will not bring this information forward for use in Statoil.  
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5 Findings 
This section aims to present results and findings from 1) the study of selected contracts and 2) 
interviews with designated professionals with in-depth knowledge about contractual 
applications on the NCS and/or GOM.   
5.1 Document Analysis of Contracts 
The document analysis was first and foremost meant to provide a broader insight into the 
content and structure of the various agreements, with special focus on contract type, and 
degree of formalization as defined above.  Below is a listing of what was found during the 
review of contracts relevant for the two regions.  I will later discuss what the findings means 
in the context of contract types and formalization. 
5.1.1. Statoil’s standard contract for drilling and well services on the NCS 
Statoil has a setup with a “general” template, and discipline requirements are added to this 
template depending on services to be contracted.  Below in table 5 is a presentation of the 
contract up against our definition of contract formalization.  The discipline requirements are 
excluded from this initial analysis as they are contract or service specific.  I will come back to 
the relevance of these later. 
Table 5 – Statoil standard contract for drilling and well services 
# Provisions Included Sub-provisions relevant for formalization and contract type 
1 Administrative 
Provisions and 
Definitions 
Yes - >30 definitions of contract terms, structured. 
- Exclusivity. 
- Company Representative and his role. 
2 Contract Structure Yes - Structure of contract (terms and conditions, exhibits and. 
  purchase order), prevailing provisions. 
- The purpose and role of the Purchase Order. 
3 Performance of the work Yes - Authority Requirements. 
- Contractors equipment and personnel. 
- Quality, Health, Safety and Environment (QHSE). 
4 Progress of the work Yes - Delayed progress and reporting of such. 
5 Variations, cancellations 
and Suspension 
Yes - Detailed provisions for Variation Orders and requests for such. 
- Definition of cancellation and effect of such. 
- Definition of Suspension and effect of such. 
6 Delivery and Payment Yes - Compensation, Invoicing, Payments and Audits. 
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- Title and ownership. 
7 Breach of Contract Yes - Effects of breach of contract due to delay or defect. 
- Effects of company’s breach of contract. 
- Contractor’s limitations of liability. 
8 Force Majeure Yes - Effects, notification and cancellation due to Force Majeure. 
9 Liability and Insurances Yes - Contractor and Company’s indemnity. 
- Indemnity for parties not a part of Contractor or Company. 
- Limitations to indemnity regime in cases of  subsea pollution and 
  pollution from reservoir, in-hole equipment and loss of well. 
- Indirect losses. 
- General insurance requirements without insurance limits. 
10 Proprietary Rights and 
Confidentiality 
Provisions 
Yes - Rights to information and technology. 
- Confidentiality provisions. 
11 Dispute Resolution Yes - Court proceedings. 
12 A pre-defined scope of 
work 
Yes - Detailed description of the work to be performed under the 
  contract. 
- Area of operations. 
- Requirements to contractor’s equipment and personnel. 
- Delivery and Mobilization. 
- Optional work outside pre-defined area of operation. 
13 Compensation format Yes - Description of rates available under the contract for equipment 
  and personnel. 
- Terms of delivery. 
- Penalties available under the contract. 
- Yearly price adjustments based on pre-defined indexes. 
14 Administration 
requirements 
Yes - Requirements to Health, Safety and Environments. 
- Requirements to Quality Management Systems. 
- Requirements for montly, daily and and of project reporting. 
15 Technical Specifications Yes - Technical specifications for equipment needed to perform the 
   work and covered under the contract. 
 
5.1.2. Typical US Gulf of Mexico Drilling and Well Services Contract 
Table 6 below constitutes a summary of three contracts obtained from three individual 
sources.  Two of them are actual contracts in use or in recent use in US GOM.  The last one is 
forwarded as an example of industry standards for US GOM.  Information about the 
respective contract parties is considered confidential. As for most contracts for the US GOM, 
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these are structured in the form of Master Service Agreements (hereafter referred to as MSA).  
An MSA constitutes in US GOM mostly terms and conditions.  In addition, you may often 
find a list of applicable services and a standardized price book provided by the service 
provider.  Other documents are (sometimes) established project by project/ well by well and 
not as a part of a long term arrangement between the parties. 
I have in some places used a ratio to indicate whether a certain provision is included or not 
(in a total of 3 contracts).  The sample size is just not large enough to conclude on, especially 
where there are discrepancies within the samples. 
Table 6 – Typical US Gulf of Mexico drilling and well service contract 
# Provisions Included Sub-provisions relevant for formalization and contract type 
1 Administrative 
Provisions and 
Definitions 
YES 
 
- 0 - 7 Definitions of Contract Terms, limited structure. 
- No exclusivity. 
- No information about personnel authorized to operationalize the 
  contract – done on project basis. 
2 Contract Structure YES - Structure of Contract (terms and conditions, list of services,  
   standard price schedule) and prevailing provisions. 
- The purpose of the purchase order. 
3 Performance of the work YES - Authority Requirements. 
- Independent Contractor. 
- Standards of Performance. 
4 Progress of the work YES (2/3) - Limited information about progress. 
5 Variations, cancellations 
and Suspension 
YES (2/3) - Mutual termination rights. 
- change and amendment mentioned, limited procedures. 
6 Delivery and Payment YES - Invoicing/payment Requirements. 
- limited information on transfer of ownership. 
7 Breach of Contract YES - Simple provisions for breach of contract and Company’s rights  
   in case of breach. 
8 Force Majeure YES (2/3) - Effects, notification and cancellation due to Force Majeure. 
9 Liability and Insurances YES - Contractor and Company’s indemnity.   
- Limitations due to Care, Custody and Control . 
- Extensive insurance requirements with pre-defined limits for 
various activities that may occur under the contract. 
10 Proprietary Rights and 
Confidentiality 
Provisions 
YES - Somewhat simple confidentiality provisions. 
- No information on Intellectual Property. 
11 Dispute Resolution YES - Two of the agreements had provisions for court proceedings 
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12 A pre-defined scope of 
work 
NO - Listing of services that can be called off under the agreement. 
13 Compensation format NO - Sometimes a detailed price book for all available services is 
attached to the MSA. 
14 Administration 
requirements 
NO - No adm requirements. 
- Drug and Alcohol Policy. 
15 Technical Specifications NO - No technical requirements. 
5.2 Interviews 
This section will describe and present the findings related to the remaining part of the 
research problem.  Information was collected through unstructured/ semi structured 
interviews with targeted representatives from the largest drilling and well services providers4, 
personnel with significant experience working for various oil companies5, and advisors 
within Statoil in Norway6
5.2.1. Contract types 
.  The interviews conducted with the advisors in Norway were 
mainly through telephone-interview with follow up questions via email.  Interviews made in 
the US were conducted face to face over extended lunch to minimize interview object’s 
“unproductive” time. 
The services that are performed are identical in the two regions, but there are distinct 
differences when it comes to the contracting of these.   
In Norway, the majority of the contracts are based on Norsk Fabrikasjonskontrakt, NF07, also 
for drilling and well services.  This is verified directly through access to Statoil contracts, but 
also through discussions with discipline advisors in Statoil regarding what is used in the 
marketplace in general. Statoil is actually bound to use NF07 in many areas, especially within 
                                                 
4 Sustin Irvin, Senior Account Representative with Halliburton. Interview 08.03.2011 
  Alan McDill and Robert Brownly, Senior Account Representatives with Baker. Interview 09.03.2011 
  Per Irgens, Wireline Sales Representative with Schlumberger. Interview 17.03.2011 
  Tip Cain, Senior Sales Representative with Quail Tools. Interview 16.03.2011 
5 Kenneth Dillard, former Procurement Manager with Statoil Gulf of Mexico. Interview 02.03.2011 
  Dana S. Pitre, Sr Procurement Specialist with Statoil Gulf of Mexico. Interview 03.03.2011 
6 Jan Hegdal, Advisor Strategic Procurement with Statoil ASA. Interview 17.03.2011 
  Inger Mari Sjo Johannesen, Specialist Procurement and Logistics with Statoil ASA. Email 11.03.2011 
  Roger Foss, Chief Consultant SCM with Statoil ASA. Email 10.03.2011 
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projects (Rydin7
There are however, according to Kaasen
).  The contracts are mostly time bound, meaning that there is an i.e. 4 year 
firm contract period, with optional periods following that.  
8
Even though the contracts that I have been able to access addresses mostly the same issues 
and have somewhat similar format, it appears from interviewing both service companies and 
Statoil representatives in Houston that there is no given contract standard in US GOM.    
Some of the respondents mentioned however the Universal Commercial Code (UCC) in the 
US as a reference point for many companies, and also as a fall back where no contract was in 
place.  There are standards in the market such as the IADC standard, which is a standard from 
the International Association of Drilling Contractors.  This standard is applicable for drilling 
contracts (i.e. for hire of drilling rigs/ vessels), but these are rarely used for drilling and well 
services contract, which is the segment relevant for this thesis. 
 examples of international majors using their 
international standard that they have in place on a corporate level with the large international 
service providers.  
The US GOM service contracts appear to be less time bound than what is seen on the NCS.  
In the US, they operate with what is called evergreen master service agreements that has a 
clear start date, but at any given time under the contract, it is unclear how long the contract 
will last.  It was however mentioned by one of the service companies that the industry is 
going away from these kinds of contracts, mostly due to scope creep and changes in risk and 
political environment. 
On questions regarding objectives with the way the contract is laid out, the respondents 
answered both for the NCS and in US GOM that the contracts in large appear to try to 
encompass or overcome all thinkable situations that may occur.  They don’t necessarily 
address this in specifics, but through provisions that are constructed to work as a frame and 
govern future occurrences, including variations and amendments. 
Several respondents from the service providers brought up the amount of oil companies in the 
US GOM market compared to other regions as a key to the current contract structures.  If 
there were a limited amount of customers out there then they would be able to negotiate 
customized agreements/price formats with each of these.  However, with the US GOM 
                                                 
7 Fredrik Stang Rydin, former CPO of Hydro and currently Procurement manager with Statoil Gulf of Mexico.   
  Interview. 16.03.2011 
8 Knut Kaasen, Professor with Nordisk institutt for sjørett, UiO. Email 22.03.2011 
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market they consider this close to impossible.  They would have to hire significantly more 
staff just to manage the amount of different agreements.  And with the pressure on low 
pricing they don’t believe that the oil companies would pay for additional staffing in the 
office.  The industry has therefore somewhat accepted this approach as the most efficient one, 
at least in the past.  Today, most companies require a signed MSA for work to occur, not just 
a purchase order. 
In addition to the written, signed contract the participants also all underlined the importance 
of client and contractor relationship management.  There is a common realization that no 
matter how well highly paid lawyers and teams of industry professionals try to map out 
everything, they have yet to be able to incorporate all possible future scenarios in the written 
contract.  It should also be mentioned that according to the majority of the respondents this is 
often where relationships play a key role, especially where the contracts are long term the 
customer/contractor relationship management has high focus and also most benefits.  A long 
term relationship enables the various involved personnel to also get to know the spirit of the 
contract in a better way and thereby more easily be able to solve problems not governed by 
the contract.  Quarterly management meetings are a forum that is often used to foster good 
communication between the larger companies. 
From a performance perspective it is important to monitor progress and performance, but 
from a business perspective, it is out most important to have a good relationship with your 
client or your supplier.  Even though the respondents pointed out that relations are crucial, 
especially if one ends up in situation that is not described in the contracts, they also 
responded that good relations sometimes even overrides the written contract where the 
applicable situation actually is governed by the contract.  It was pointed out that this was 
mostly applicable (according to their experience) in business relationships where they had 
exclusive rights to supply the company of the specific services.   
When it comes to relationship management, most respondents mentioned that the importance 
of such was more important the more formalized the business relationship was.  One of the 
key goals when having a secured supply under a long term exclusive agreement is to earn 
additional business.  One of the respondents from the service providers mentioned that they 
had provided their services to a very large oil company consecutively for more than 25 years.  
This was partially related to their performance of course, but the respondent made it clear that 
it was in large, due to the excellent relationship between the parties. 
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Further it was clear that the standard in US GOM had been that the service companies were 
easily replaced if they did not perform according to expectation from the oil companies.  This 
had changed a little bit the last ten years, but is still very common.  From NCS where the 
standard is long term contracts, it is not common to replace contractors within the duration of 
the contract, but rather work together as a team to focus on continuous improvement and to 
solve any challenges that might come along.  This was according to Statoil one of the primary 
reason for the contract format in use today. 
5.2.2. Regional differences in degree of formalization  
This section was partially covered through the document analysis, but I also wanted 
additional information and explanation from other parties to confirm and verify what I saw 
through the content analysis.  In addition, the content analysis did not say anything about 
reasons for any differences. 
All the interview objects explained the US GOM contract structure to be MSAs, as explained 
earlier.  The MSAs are meant to represent the legal framework for work ordered by an oil 
company (i.e.  Chevron, BP or Shell) and performed by a service provider (i.e.  Halliburton, 
Schlumberger or Baker Hughes).  There are no commitments from either party under the 
MSA, meaning that all work is being awarded on a well or project basis.  This gives both 
parties both advantages and disadvantages.  For the oil companies, this means that they are 
freer to terminate the use of certain service providers due to under par performance and they 
can also bid this out as often as they want in order to obtain best price and availability in the 
market at any given time.  For the service provider, one of the main drawbacks is lack of 
possibility to plan demand.  One of the service provider respondents mentioned that they 
were not able to access the best tools in the company purely because everything in the US 
GOM was short term contracts.  Their corporate management prioritized having those kinds 
of tools in regions where they knew they were able to sell this on a frequent basis (i.e. on the 
NCS where Statoil is using these tools under long term agreements).  It was further 
mentioned that all capital expenditure had to be justified through future committed work and 
that this “rule” had become even stricter after the recent financial turmoil.  On the positive 
side regarding short term contracts, if the service provider is out bid by a competitor then it is 
only for a short term period.  In a long term contract the service provider may be out for an 
extended period of time. 
59 
Further, it was emphasized that MSAs are put in place between two parties without any ties 
to a specific scope of work, but merely as a tool to eliminate the need to negotiate terms and 
conditions every time work is supposed to be conducted.  Especially in the US with the 
extensive legal focus, without an MSA in place you could easily kill projects due to the extra 
time required to enter into contracts.  The interview objects mentioned both MSAs that were 
time bound and MSAs that were evergreen (no end date), with the latter currently being the 
predominant format.  It was also mentioned that only 5-8 years ago this was more like a 
handshake business, and that a written contract was often not required.  This is not the case 
today. 
One of the service providers did mention that they had scope specific and time bound 
contracts in place for a few services.  This was specifically related to contracts where large 
units had to be placed onboard a drilling rig to perform the service.  Instead of quoting 
services per project or well, this interview subject believed that the oil companies found it 
more cost effective to keep one contractor (one large integrated unit) onboard for an extended 
period of time.  The interviewee said that 3-5 years was the most common duration for such 
contracts. 
Two of the service providers also mentioned that they have a standardized price book with 
terms and conditions included, so that if someone calls on them to perform work, and where 
no MSA is in place, then their price book could constitute the agreement between the parties.  
Pricing is provided as a discount to this pricebook, and changes in pricing is usually reflected 
as an adjusted discount.  There is no pre-defined process, but something the contractor will 
request based on actual price increase. 
In Norway there is, according to the interview subjects from Statoil, traditionally frame 
contracts or frame agreements in place for all services procured with a relatively high 
frequency or where access to limited materials/services is crucial for the business.  A frame 
contract is a scope specific and time bound agreement with a sole service provider, to provide 
a certain service to the entire oil company.  A frame agreement is the same as a frame 
contract, but under an agreement an oil company has the opportunity to contract several 
service providers for the same service, and let them compete per well or project.  A frame 
contract/agreement in Statoil, which is based on NF07, and is the standard on the NCS, is 
compiled as presented in the following table 7, summarized for easy presentation: 
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Table 7 - Standard NF07 setup 
Structure Name 
Terms and Conditions Conditions of Contract 
Exhibit A Scope of Work 
Exhibit B Compensation 
Exhibit C Contract Schedule 
Exhibit D Administration Requirements 
Exhibit E Specifications 
Exhibit F Drawing 
Exhibit G Company Provided Items 
Exhibit H Subcontractors 
Exhibit I Company’s Insurances 
Exhibit J Standard Bank Guarantee 
Exhibit K Contractor’s proprietary information 
Exhibit L Parent Company Guarantee 
 
An interesting thing to point out from this is that the advisor in Statoil could tell that they are 
moving in the directions of MSAs as well.  In very recent years they have established MSAs 
with their largest service providers within drilling and well services.  This is done for two 
main reasons, 1) to reduce transaction costs by making the tendering processes more efficient 
and 2) to use frequent tenders in markets where competition was limited.  The experience was 
that you spent a long time in a contract evaluation to work out the legal terms and conditions 
instead of focusing on pricing and pricing structures to cut the best possible deal.  And where 
you in addition did not have sufficient competition, this approach of long term agreements 
did not work very well.  There were low discounts in pricing, and high barriers for entry for 
new entrants.   
These MSAs are not time bound and lists the various services that are applicable under the 
agreement.  It was underlined that even though MSAs were in place, the strategy of going 
with long term contracts remains as default.   
5.2.3. Factors impacting degree of formalization 
When it came to asking about why there exists various contract structures, then the majority 
mentioned it was because of risk based contracting.  Not only when thinking MSA or not, but 
actually within most aspects within procurement and business relationships.  With risk based 
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contracting, they talk about an approach to contracting based on the risk of getting access to 
the service at the right price, quality and time where shortage in availability of certain 
equipment or services automatically generate a need for a more firm framework that can 
secure this supply.  This was further said to differ from company to company and depended 
on how well contracted goods or services, repective variation in quality, time and price of 
such, would impact the company’s value proposition. 
Size and solidity of the company was mentioned as a differentiator and it was also mentioned 
that there was a positive correlation between the size of the company and degree of 
formalization.  Larger solid companies are able to handle commitments and take on more 
risks.  Less solid companies are more likely to have less formalized frameworks as they shop 
from well to well and must have efficient tools to do so, and not large ridged forms that take 
months to negotiate. 
The cost of operations was another factor that was mentioned.  The higher the cost of the 
operations, the more important it is to keep those operations going.  In the US there are land 
operations where the rig cost might be USD 20 – 25,000 a day, while in deeper water there 
are rigs running at USD 600,000 a day.  Cost and risk associated with these operations vary 
significantly as well as the need for adequate governance, including safeguards and a highly 
specified contracts. 
Infrastructure came out as a differentiator as well.  While in US GOM there is a great oil and 
gas industry infrastructure, you may in other parts of the world, be rather on your own when 
drilling.  In remote locations, there is a greater need for longer formalized contracts while you 
in the US GOM have such high competition that you are able to source locally, and the need 
for long term commitments are limited.  This is not relevant for most drilling operations 
conducted in Norway, but it can be for the northernmost locations. 
Another interesting factor that was brought forward by several of the service companies was 
how short sighted the US market often is.  The US services market is very much driven by 
“wall street” and results for the next quarter.  There appear to be limited thinking of long term 
formalized commitments versus limited terms and conditions and a quick round of quotations 
to obtain the best price.   
Bundling of services was also pointed out as a factor by the Statoil representatives in 
Houston.  During the last six years there has been a fragmentation of services in the US 
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GOM.  On the NCS and many other regions, services are to a greater extent bundled.  This 
boosts the value of each contract and thereby the need formalize the relationship in a more 
extensive way.  The reason for this fragmentation is many, but those that were mentioned 
were 1) the service companies ended up losing to much through bundled services, and 2) as 
the industry moved to deep-water with higher rig rates, the reliability of the various tools 
became more and more important.  The various oil companies wanted hands on business 
relationships with the company that was providing the service instead of them having to go 
through a third party just because the client required bundling of services. 
Several of the respondents in the US mentioned historic events as triggers for additional 
formalization.  September 11th and the Macondo incident in the US GOM was mentioned as 
examples.  The first one led to an increased formalization of specifically insurance rules and 
regulations as companies became more risk adverse.  It was very expensive to buy insurance 
and some could not even get it.  When it comes to the Macondo incident, they all mentioned 
that it may be too early to tell as drilling is just about to resume in the US GOM this spring of 
2011 (deepwater drilling has been on hold due to drilling moratorium and withheld permits 
following the accident).  However, some signs of where this is going is already clear.  One of 
the service providers mentioned internal shifting of roles and responsibilities when it came to 
approval of oil companies’ terms and conditions.  Earlier it was the line management (i.e.  
drilling department) that had the final say, but now the lawyers have been given additional 
responsibility and power to ensure that the service provider does not take on unintended risk.  
The other service company respondents confirm the picture by saying that they have become 
more risk adverse and that intent in the contracts will be limited as much as possible.  The 
intent is to be replaced by written risk distribution.  From Statoil’s side, it is expected that the 
service providers have an increased focus on indemnification, risk and liability going 
forward. 
5.2.4. Change in contract type and degree of formalization 
This topic has a somewhat theoretical basis and when interviewing, it was impossible to 
discuss all the elements that distinguish the various contract types and affect the degree of 
formalization.  However, through use of illustrations and examples, the interview subjects 
understood the concept and were able to answer, in a quite cohesive way. 
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For long term formalized agreements, the interviewees elaborated on the importance of the 
written contract in the startup phase of a contract.  During this time the contract is “the bible” 
and used and referenced in most communication between the supplier and the client.  This 
applies both for US GOM and NCS.  However, as time goes on, relations continue to play a 
bigger role in the business relationship; the contract is not that often used in conversations, 
and relations get a more important role.  One of the respondents mentioned that they have had 
a very important client for a number of years, and they are now able to agree on changes to 
the contract on a management level without involving procurement or the legal department.  
He also pointed out that it has to be mutual, so that the contractors might have to give a little 
as well in tough economic times where either the oil price is low or there are bad economic 
times in general.  This would, according to them, not worked out if the client was just 
shopping around. 
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6 Discussion  
Through analysis and argumentation I have, in this section, tried to combine the findings 
presented in the previous section with appropriate theory.  I have based the discussion on the 
four research questions for this thesis and structured the section accordingly. 
6.1 Contract types used for drilling and well services contracts 
To determine the contract type, I have used both document analysis and interviews as sources 
of information.  The document analysis was meant to give more accurate and detailed 
information than any interview would be able to provide.  On the other hand, the document 
analysis does not provide much information about the contractual relationships.  This is 
where the interviews proved to be a good source of information. 
In order to provide a structured discussion, I decided to base this on Table 2 – Contract 
Types, and the variables used to distinguish the contract types.  However, before getting into 
all the details it is important to clarify that the contracts from both regions have both written 
and non-written elements to them, but they vary between the regions. 
6.1.1. Personal involvement (and the importance of vendor selection) 
The contract for NCS does not state anything explicitly about personal involvement, but the 
clauses in the contract clearly leaves room for human interaction.  This specifically comes 
into effect when you are either deviating from the contract or you are in a situation of default.  
The contracts are long term, pricing is often fixed or indexed (pre-determined), and the work 
is called out with the use of a Purchase Order.  This reduces the need for personal 
involvement if the contract is followed.  On the other side, one of the reasons why we have 
the long term contracts in Norway is to enable an increased dialogue between the companies 
to facilitate teamwork and innovation.  In this respect the quarterly meetings play an 
important role.  Good relations are very important when change occurs.  A common 
understanding that is built on trust and desire to create a win-win solution is key to make this 
work.  Personal involvement indicates that we are either under a neo classic or relational 
contract, or somewhere between. 
The contracts for GOM do not state anything specifically about personal involvement either.  
Personal relations appear however, to be quite different.  Under the standard MSAs you have 
long lasting relationships (evergreen) formalized through a rather limited contract, with 
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frequent short term projects with limited continuity.  There is no doubt that having an 
extensive amount of personal involvement, along with relationship building and maintenance 
is key to earn future business. 
As these contracts relate to services, there is obvious personal involvement at the execution 
phase of the contract.  And in saying this, it is worth mentioning that there is a delay between 
time of contract and time of performance.  Drilling and well services are complex services, 
and the oil companies spend much time selecting the right vendors.  Defect services on a rig 
can lead to consequential losses for the operator that is much greater in monetary value than 
the service actually causing the problem.  It is therefore crucial that the contracting 
companies have a proper quality, health, safety and environment system that is not only in 
place, but also followed. It is not just because of potential errors that it is also important to 
perform a proper vendor selection, these rig operations may run up to one million dollars per 
day, so if you are able to get hold of the most efficient vendor, then this may save you a 
tremendous amount of money on a deep water well, estimated to take 180 days to drill. 
6.1.2. Presentiation 
It appears both from the document analysis and the interviews that the NCS contract goes 
further than the US GOM model when it comes to presentiation.  The NCS contract appears 
to be more detailed within most areas, trying to predict and handle future occurrences.  
However, everybody involved understands that it is impossible to foresee all future events 
under contracts applicable for this kind of work.  Both the contracts are therefore very 
process oriented where they just line up the processes without trying to predict every possible 
outcome.   
Something worth mentioning however, are the effects reported after the Macondo incident. 
There appears to be a push regarding a higher level of contract detail, something that would 
drive the contracts in the direction of presentiation. 
As in previous sections, relations are key whenever agreements on complex challenges need 
to reached. 
Still, for these kinds of services, we are far away from full presentiation which is seen in 
classic contracts. 
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6.1.3. Planning 
Work performed under these agreements is complex, and may have a long duration with 
several phases.  Planning performed prior to commencement is binding, but only if there are 
no changes in the project/contract itself.  The planning is made as specific and complete as 
feasibly possible.  It is however only complete if there are no changes required to basis. 
A discrete transaction that is presentiated will have no need for post commencement 
planning.  However, for these contracts, extensive planning is required, also after 
commencement.  This is related, amongst others, to duration and complexity of the 
agreement, and indicates a type of contracts other than classic contracts. 
6.1.4. Communication 
Through the document analysis it was somewhat noticeable that the requirements for 
communication were stricter under the NCS contract compared to the GOM contracts.  In the 
NCS contracts, there were personnel identified and authorized to act on behalf of the contract 
parties.  There was also within certain segments of the contracts detailed requirements for 
information exchange and formal communication between the parties (i.e in case of 
variations).  This would indicate a very formal approach to communication under the NCS 
contracts.  The GOM MSAs were not in any way formalized to this extent and could indicate 
a less informal approach. 
From an operational perspective however, one would both have formal and informal 
communication.  Even though it was only the NCS contracts that indicated nomination of 
personnel one would find these nominations at the work order level in both regions.  The 
nature of the work covered by these contracts requires an intimate working relationship to 
solve the challenging tasks. 
In addition there is, especially under the NCS contracts, much contact at various levels 
independent of the actual ongoing work assignments, i.e management meetings, performance 
reviews etc.  This can be of an informal or more formal character, and will tend to develop 
through a working relationship, and the norms existing in such relationship.  Feedback, 
especially from Quail tools indicate that the norms may be a little different under a GOM 
MSA than an NCS contract as one under a GOM MSA you do not have the same guarantee 
for future work.  The security of future work under the NCS contracts enables the contractor, 
according to the informant from Quail tools, to invest more time and resources in long term 
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development and improvement projects, rather than just going from job to job.  Similarly, the 
communication under these regimes is different, as in an MSA there isn’t this security and 
need to always sell in the next job. 
In the two regions there are elements of both requirements for formal communication derived 
from the contract, and natural rather extensive informal communication driven by long term 
relationship and contractor performance management.  The limited requirements to formal 
communication, on a contract level, in the GOM MSAs appear to be somewhat symptomatic 
for a more relational approach to contracting. 
6.1.5. Commencement and Termination 
The formal contracts in place between the parties in both regions have a clear commencement 
date.  This is the commencement of the formal relationship, not the actual work, or the 
informal relationship that is likely to have been in place prior to this.  The contracts on the 
NCS have a somewhat clear end date, i.e. four years after commencement, though with 
possibilities to extend the contracts with pre-defined periods of x years, months or wells.  The 
optional periods reduced the clear boundaries in the agreement which we see in more classic 
contracts.  From US GOM we see that a large degree of the agreements are evergreen.  This 
would indicate a more relational approach to contracting than on the NCS. 
At the same time, even though one under an MSA has a long term agreement, this does not 
mean that work is continuously ongoing.  The GOM MSA way of contracting with frequent 
short term jobs, limited exclusiveness or long term commitments, and easy termination could 
actually, in a way, represent a sharp in and sharp out.  So in one aspect, the overriding MSA 
is pulling this type of contract in a relational direction, but the operationalization of this 
agreement, seen in an isolated event, is pulling it in a more classical direction.  Zenger and 
Poppo (2002) do discuss contract types as complimentary to each other, and what we see here 
may be an example of just this.  Through the words easy termination we also recognize lack 
of the relational norm preservation of the relation as discussed in Brynhildsvoll (2005) and 
referenced earlier. 
6.1.6. Duration 
The majority of well services performed on the NCS and/or in GOM is performed either 
under a frame agreement or under an MSA.  As mentioned earlier, close to no well services 
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will be performed in GOM without an MSA in place.  On the NCS, the representative from 
Statoil clarified that frame agreements were put in place wherever there were frequent 
purchases of the same service or where the service was of strategic importance to Statoil.  
This clearly indicates a long term formal relationship between the parties which eliminates 
the classic contract types.   
The formal contracts on NCS are mainly of limited duration indicating a neoclassic contract, 
while the GOM agreements are somewhere in the middle of neoclassic contracts and 
relational contracts due to their focus on evergreen contracts.   
Independent of the formal written contract in place, there is relationships existing between the 
parties that have been there for a long time, and will continue to be for an unknown number 
of years, all pulling this in a relational direction. 
6.1.7. Number of participants 
The contracts that I have analyzed for this thesis have two contract parties, as per legal 
definition.  However, there are often several parties involved through a hierarchy of 
contractors and sub-contractors.  Within the drilling and well services, we however see a 
clear difference between NCS and GOM.  On the NCS you have a much larger use of 
subcontractors for drilling and well services than what is normal in the US GOM.  This is 
assumed to be something that has developed over time due to the market power of the larger 
oil companies on the NCS (Statoil and Hydro) and their requirements for bundled services.  
In the US GOM, the contractors have historically had more bargaining power and been able 
to withstand this requirement.  You can therefore say that there are often more parties 
involved in a specific contractual relationship on NCS than in GOM.  This would pull the US 
GOM agreements in a classical contract direction, while for the NCS contract this identified 
would pull these types of contracts in a neoclassic and relational direction. 
6.1.8. Transferability 
There is little to nothing standing in the way of the transfer of a discrete transaction, but it 
becomes a little more complicated when it comes to contractual relations.  There is nothing 
that really separates the GOM or NCS practice on this point other than that the language 
appears to be more formalized in the NCS contracts.  The contracts are transferable i.e in the 
form of assignment.  Assignment was reviewed in the document analysis although not made 
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into a separate point in the overview.  This was also briefly covered through my session with 
the Statoil advisor.   
Basically this means that a contract can i.e be assigned from Company X to Company Y 
permanently or for a period of time.  Permanently i.e with respect to a buy out/ merger, and 
temporarily in case of a corporation between Company X and Company Y where Company X 
assigns all its rights and obligations under a contract to Company Y.  This is relatively easy 
on the formal side, but the informal relational part is the demanding one.  MacNeil writes in 
his “Many futures of Contracts” (1974) that this may be almost impossible to achieve, or at 
least uneconomical under contractual relations, while he in “The New Social Contract”  
(1978) actually changed his mind finding his work of 1974 to be inaccurate on this point.  He 
refers to a buyout and transfer of employees, but I believe this also could be applied for these 
contracts with respect to assignments.  The key here will be communication and exchange of 
information. 
6.1.9. Requirement for future cooperation 
The nature of drilling and well service work requires significant follow up after a contract is 
signed or a relationship initiated.  This comes to both planning and post commencement 
planning, but also performance and follow up post performance.  This relates both to GOM 
MSAs and NCS contracts which would pull them in a relational direction.  The only apparent 
difference here would be requirements for performance and technical requirements to be used 
for future planning that is included in the NCS contracts.  This does not change the fact that 
future cooperation is required, but it may simplify the cooperation if the map and tools is 
already in place through the formalized contract.  The short duration and sharp in – sharp out 
commencement/termination eliminates the need for post commencement cooperation and 
future performance in order to succeed. 
6.1.10. Division of burdens and benefits 
As for the above, there appears to be limited differences in the actual contracts with respect to 
division of burdens and benefits.  As for typical classical contracts, work/performance is 
exchanged against compensation.  However, the additional dimension under the drilling and 
well services contracts are additional burdens and benefits based on the performance.  Poor 
performance on one part hurts both or all parties in the projects, while good performance 
benefits both or all parties in the project.  A drilling service contractor that performs 
70 
uninterrupted drilling over a long period of time may be rewarded with a bonus in addition to 
his base payment.  The oil company has saved significant time and thereby shares some of 
these benefits with the drilling contractor.  The same applies if he delivers his tools too late to 
the shore-base and the oil company has to wait for the tools and suffers rig time.  The 
contracts may here require the drilling company to share some of this burden.  The NCS 
contract is somewhat more formalized within the area, but through interviews, it is 
discovered that even though it is not necessarily recorded in the contracts, they experience 
that the oil companies still try to recoup cost related to lost time incidents. 
6.2 Regional differences in degree of formalization  
 
This section is mainly based on the document analysis, though with some input from the 
interviews.  The nature of the content limits the amount of information that was made 
available to me, however, for the purpose of the discussion I’m treating this as a 
representative sample and rather limit any subsequent conclusions. 
It is important to point out that it is not the difference in specific items that is important but 
the total assessment of all the items together. 
The below table is a summary of the findings after studying the contracts.  I have used 
YES/NO to denote whether the actual provision was included in the contract and 
Extensive/Moderate/Limited/Not included to denote the comprehensiveness of the provision, 
if at all included 
 
 
Table 8 – Contract Formalization Comparison 
 
# Contract Provisions Examples 
Included? 
Comprehensiveness of provision 
NCS Contract GOM MSA 
1 Administrative 
Provisions and 
Definitions 
• Definition of contract terms. 
• Exclusive supply. 
• Who has authority to act under the 
contract? 
YES 
Extensive 
YES 
Limited 
2 Contract Structure • What contract documents 
constitutes the contract? 
• What takes precedence in case of 
YES 
Moderate 
YES 
Moderate 
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conflict? 
3 Performance of the 
Work 
• Minimum requirements for 
performance. 
• Requirements for Quality 
Systems. 
• Authority Requirements. 
YES 
Extensive 
YES 
Limited 
4 Progress of the Work • Reporting of delayed progress. YES 
Moderate 
YES (2/3) 
Limited 
5 Variations, 
Cancellations and 
Suspension 
• The variation order process. 
• When to cancel and when to 
suspend. 
YES 
Very Extensive 
YES (2/3) 
Limited 
6 Delivery and 
Payment  
• Delivery and transfer of 
ownership. 
• Invoicing requirements and 
payment process. 
YES 
Moderate 
YES 
Moderate 
7 Breach of Contract • Rectification and guarantee 
liability. 
• Liquidated damages. 
YES 
Extensive 
YES 
Limited 
8 Force Majeure • Effects of Force Majeure. YES 
Moderate 
YES (2/3) 
Moderate 
9 Liability and 
Insurances 
• Mutual Indemnification. 
• Limitation of liability. 
YES 
Extensive 
YES 
Extensive 
10 Property Rights • Rights to information, technology 
and inventions. 
• Confidential information. 
YES 
Moderate 
YES 
Limited 
11 Law and dispute 
resolution 
• Governing law. 
• Procedure for dispute resolution. 
YES 
Moderate 
YES 
Moderate 
12 Scope of work • Area of operation/application. 
• Requirements for personnel and 
equipment. 
• Deliverables and Reporting. 
YES 
Extensive 
NO 
Not included 
13 Compensation 
format 
• Definition of rates for personnel 
and equipment. 
• Penalties and bonuses. 
• Adjustment of pricing. 
• Price list. 
YES 
Extensive 
NO 
Not included 
14 Administration 
requirements 
• Requirements to Quality 
Management Systems. 
YES 
Extensive 
YES 
Limited 
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• Requirements for Health Safety 
and Environment. 
• Reporting routines. 
15 Technical 
Specifications 
• Technical specifications of 
equipment to be used under the 
contract. 
YES 
Moderate/ 
Extensive 
NO 
Not included 
 
 
Administrative Provisions and Definitions 
The NCS contract has an extensive set of definitions in the contract making it crystal clear 
what is meant with a set of important concepts used later in the contract.  The MSAs had only 
a few definitions which were also in some of the contracts spread throughout the agreement.  
This may not be an important subject in itself, but very symptomatic for formalization of 
these agreements. 
An important difference however is the use of exclusive rights.  It was found through the 
interviews that this is widely used in Norway, but to a less degree in GOM.  The importance 
of this is that the relationship which is created between two entities, when in close 
cooperation over time, rather than when companies shop around for each project.  Building of 
trust would, in a relational contracting perspective some places, replace the need for formal 
contracts, however; what we see here is that the contracts with exclusive rights and long term 
commitments are those that are the most formalized. 
Another important concept is the concept of authorized personnel to act on behalf of the 
contract entities.  There is no such wording in the MSAs, but it has an important function in 
the NCS contracts.  Through discussions with Statoil legal, it is pointed out that, in their 
view, it is very important to ensure that all contractual formal information is routed to the 
correct person authorized by the Company to act on its behalf.  There is also an automatic 
replacement of personnel in this position after four years to ensure that the contractual 
safeguards are complied with and not ruled insignificant due to relational influence.  These 
rules clearly indicate that Statoil is aware of pitfalls related to relational governance and take 
appropriate actions to protect the individual and the company.   
Contract Structure 
There were no significant differences under these provisions.  Worth mentioning is however, 
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that all contracts listed the Terms and Conditions prevailing over all other documents and 
communication. 
 
Performance of the Work 
There was surprisingly limited language concerning authority requirements and standards of 
performance, equipment and personnel in the MSAs.  This is a key provision in the NCS 
contracts.  The most important reason for this, according to some of the experts referenced 
earlier, is related to the warranty language in the contracts where they in the US do not 
warrant intent, while this is a requirement in the NCS contracts.  The intent is therefore to a 
larger degree spelled out in the NCS contracts in order to define whether a party in the 
contract is in default or not.  As mentioned earlier it is expected that the authority 
requirement provision will be made more comprehensive going forward after the Macondo 
incident and the increased focus on compliance. 
The MSA includes some language regarding “independent contractor” which is not seen in 
the NCS contracts.  This relates to separation between Company and Contractor as 
independent parties to further clarify the responsibilities between the parties.  This is 
interesting from a relational contracting perspective and norms of relational integrity, by the 
fact that these roles and responsibility are already laid out in the formal contract. 
 
Progress of the work 
No significant differences between the contracts were identified with the exception of the 
NCS contract being more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
Variations, Cancellations and Suspension 
This section is very different in the two different contracts.  The NCS contract has several 
pages on variations alone, while the MSAs barely mention variation orders.  The reason for 
the highly formalized NCS contracts in this is mainly due to this template being built on a 
fabrication template where one has turnkey or lump sum pricing and the variation order has a 
much bigger relevance than in a service contract. 
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The NCS contract also includes provisions for suspension and termination that are very 
favorable for the oil company.  This is most likely due the purchasing power of the oil 
companies signing NF07 and may not be the same for minor operators on the NCS.  The NCS 
model has a one sided termination right, while the GOM MSA has mutual termination rights.  
This itself implies more a relational approach with a win/win culture under the MSAs, rather 
than a formalistic dominating principal-agent relationship that you can interpret the NCS 
contract to be. 
 
Delivery and Payment 
No significant differences between the contracts were identified with the exception of the 
NCS contract being more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
Breach of Contract 
This is another set of provisions that is very different between the contracts.  This relates 
again back to the warranty and the use of intent in the NCS contracts.  The NCS contracts is 
highly formalized within this area with several clauses and procedures on how to handle 
defective equipment or delayed progress.  It appears that the entities putting this contract 
together have spent significant time and resources trying to predict all possible future 
outcomes, or presentiation in MacNeil’s terms. 
The GOM MSAs have some language included regarding this subject, but it is very limited.  
These findings match what the representatives from some of the service companies 
mentioned regarding handling of defective equipment or delayed work in the US GOM.  
According to them, this was more of a negotiation from occurrence to occurrence, while the 
NCS contracts have specified rules, risk distribution and liability caps in case of breach of 
contract. 
 
Force Majeure 
No significant differences between the contracts were identified with the exception of the 
NCS contract being more detailed and comprehensive. 
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Liability and Insurances 
This section is highly formalized in both the NCS contract and the GOM MSA.  The biggest 
difference found was in insurances, where there in the MSA is very detailed insurance 
requirements with pre-defined limits, while in the NCS contracts it was put on the contractor 
to ensure proper insurance coverage.  There are two reasons standing out; first, that in the US 
GOM there is a range of smaller contractors while you on the NCS mostly work with larger 
companies with bundled services.  The operators on the NCS know that these larger 
companies have sufficient securities.  Second, it is widely known that the industry in the US 
has a history of frequent court proceedings and settlements and sufficient insurance is a 
license to operate. 
 
Property Rights and Confidential Information 
There are significant differences in the amount of wording that is put into the contracts 
concerning these subjects with the NCS contract being more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
Law and Dispute Resolution 
No significant differences between the contracts were identified with the exception of the 
NCS contract being more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
Scope of Work 
It is under this and the following sections that the different formats really becomes evident.  
The NCS contract has a pre-defined scope of work with items such as personnel and 
equipment requirements, deliverables, reporting and area of operations as defaults.  In 
addition, service specific discipline requirements are added to the contract before going to the 
market for a long term contract. 
Duration is one of the keys to the differences.  As operators in the US GOM mostly work 
from well to well or project to project they do not include the scope of work at contract level, 
but at a work order level.  You will most of the time only find a listing of services that are 
applicable under the MSAs, with no scope of work connected to this.  On the NCS each 
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contract is dedicated for a certain services.  This is one of the core differences between 
contracting in the two regions, and again, the NCS contract is more formalized. 
Compensation 
After analyzing the contracts and interviewing the service companies, it is pretty clear that 
there is no standard practice in the US GOM concerning compensation formats, but the most 
common practice is that it is the contractor’s pricebook that constitutes any compensation 
format.  This is in vast contrast to how this is done on the NCS.  Information from the service 
providers indicate that it is the fragmentation of services and the amount of players in the US 
GOM that drives this setup.  As mentioned earlier, and due to the amount of operators in the 
the GOM, smaller contractor cannot work with operator-specified compensation formats 
without hiring a range of people to be up to speed on the differences in the contracts.  To 
circumvent this problem, they provide a discount to their own price list to the various 
companies based on how much business they get. 
The NCS contract is set up with a compensation format instructed by the oil company with all 
inclusive pricing, rules and regulations for adjustments of such.  In the US GOM, it is 
apparently more common that the contractor approach the oil company and request increased 
pricing based on actual cost increase (where they have submitted pricing for a longer term). 
Contract Schedule 
No significant differences between the contracts were identified with the exception of the 
NCS contract being more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
Administrative Requirements 
Clear differences are also identified under Administrative Requirements.  Extensive language 
on requirements to Quality, Health, Safety and Environment (QHSE) is included in the NCS 
contract, while this is taken care of at a work order level under an MSA.  In addition, but 
outside the contract, under both regimes there are rules and regulations for qualifications of 
the contractors’ QHSE system every year to disqualify anyone who does not follow the 
guidelines set by the operators. 
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Technical Specifications 
As for the above, there are clear differences, but it is mostly related to the contract setup.  The 
MSAs are non-specific and it is impossible include all possible technical requirements in the 
contract.  On the NCS, the contracts are service specific and it is therefore natural to 
incorporate the technical specification in the actual contract.   
 
It should be repeated that the information above is a snapshot of contracts established prior to 
the Macondo incident, and that the interviews are indicating a further formalization of the 
contracts.   
 
6.3 Factors impacting degree of formalization 
We have now looked at the degree of formalism in the two regions.  This section is divided to 
a discussion concerning factors contributing to the level of formalization in these contracts. 
 
Risk Mitigation 
We saw earlier that Homburg et.al.  (2009) described that managers tend to increase the level 
of formalization in the contracts when uncertainty is perceived to be high.  This is very much 
in line with what the industry is now facing in the aftermath of the Macondo incident.  Even 
though this accident happened only a year ago, the old companies are starting to take 
measures to reduce their risk.  We found earlier that one of the service companies have given 
their legal department more power, another service company said that they as a company are 
becoming more risk adverse.  Both of these would indicate a further formalization of the 
contract to clarify the risk distribution.  This was, according to one of the respondents for 
Statoil in Houston, also the fact after the World Trade Center incident in 2001 where 
insurance requirements became the focus.  Both of these events are something that has and 
likely will continue to have impact for contracting, especially in the US GOM.  From Norway 
there are accidents like Alexander Kielland and Piper Alpha that has had a rather large impact 
on contracting.  I have not been able to record anything regarding increased uncertainty as a 
factor to increased formalization in this matter.  However, both of these events changed 
technical requirements and the requirements to management systems which are a part of the 
NCS contract requirements today. 
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BP recently sued three of its own contractors for 40 billion USD following the Macondo 
incident (Lagorce 2011).  If BP wins this case it is likely to have a severe impact on what 
formalized contractual protection service contractors will require before entering into any 
new contract. 
 
Security of supply 
One of the key factors that was mentioned by many of the respondents was security of 
supply, and the reason for this is mainly tied up to the consequential cost of not being able to 
supply on time, and not so much on price.  Some of these drilling operations, especially those 
operating in deeper water run at approximately one million US dollars a day, so proper 
contractual safeguards to incentivize the contractor to deliver on time is considered one of the 
main reasons to a rather highly formalized contract.  I find it appropriate to point to Skogh’s 
(1989) comment here about the size a of business deal being correlated with the level of 
detail in the contracts.  Even though the explicit contract may not be of large value, it is still a 
part of a network of outsourced activities that all fail if one fail, seen in the views of an oil 
company. 
These multimillion dollar drilling rigs that are hired on long term contract are also a huge 
liability to the oil company and represent in this context the presence of asset specificity.  If 
there is a lack of supply of services and equipment, then there is at risk of putting the drilling 
rigs out of work because they cannot easily be re-deployed without a significant efficiency 
loss.  The measures suggested by the informants regarding additional safeguards are in line 
with Dyer’s (1997) work on asset specificity and complex governance structures as 
previously referenced.   
There are no significant differences in asset specificity between the two regions on this issue 
and therefore formalization of contract due to potential lack of supply should not make a 
difference in between the degree of formalization. 
 
Market Conditions 
It was mentioned by a few interview subjects that they experience a positive correlation 
between size/solidity of company and the degree of formalization.  They said that these larger 
more solid companies could take on larger commitments and more risk, and that the smaller 
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companies often driven by financial institutions operated more short term and therefore 
needed simple terms and conditions.  These observations correspond with the findings from 
Eisenhardt (1989) about a company’s staffing and degree of formalization, as does the 
contract review of Statoil’s frame agreement.  Statoil is considered a large company, well- 
staffed, and has, according to the definition of degree of formalization presented herein 
highly formalized contracts.   
Another item related to market conditions is infrastructure and what it may lead to in relation 
to contract formalization.  Even though the illustration provided by one of the American 
service companies does not address NCS in specific it may still be relevant for some areas.  
Houston, as the international hub for the oil and gas industry has all the infrastructure in 
place, all the major companies are present, all the service lines are present, and availability is 
usually really good.  This means that there is usually no need for an oil company to make 
long term contract in order to get companies interested.  They often already have the 
equipment or services available on the shelf.  If you combine this with the short term focus in 
the US you have a large incentive to optimize contract pricing at all times.  However, in order 
to facilitate frequent negotiations you need efficient governance structures (ref frequency 
dimension of transaction cost theory), and not large formalized contracts that takes months to 
negotiate.  On the other side, you find oil discoveries like the recently found Skrugard 
(Skaalmo, Bjerke & Lindeberg, 2011) in the Barent Sea where there is limited availability 
shore bases, personnel and resources.  In situations like these, the service companies tend to 
require larger commitment from the oil companies so they limit their risk related to 
investments in the area (asset specificity). 
Another factor that can be categorized under the heading market conditions is what the 
market allows in terms of bundling.  On the NCS one will find a large degree of bundling, 
while in GOM there are very specialized stand-alone services.  This means that for the same 
range of the services, more services are rolled up into one contract, making the commitment 
larger and the contract more complex.  This again means that risk for opportunism rise as 
does need for safeguards (Williamson, 1985).  As the contracts become larger, the 
compensation does as well, and again, according to Skogh (1989), so does the detailing in the 
contract (increased degree of formalization).  This is maybe the clearest differentiator 
between the region and contributor to different degree of formalization between US GOM 
and NCS. 
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6.4 Change in contract type and degree of formalization 
The information that I was able to obtain from the various interview objects regarding 
phasing, and impact on governance, were remarkably similar, both between operator and 
contractor, as well as between US and Norway.  The ruling governance method at the 
beginning of a relationship appears to be the written contract, and this is mainly because of 
the lack of trust between the parties, the parties are studying and learning one another.  This 
is in line with the findings of Jap and Ganesan (2000) described earlier. 
They further mentioned that after a while, when the relationship has grown and trust has been 
developed then the written contract became less and less used as the ruling form of 
governance (it does not mean that the contract or degree of formalization changes, it only 
means that the use of the contract to govern the relationship does).   Now it is relationship 
and relational norms that to a larger degree governs the relationship to whether that be 
according to or outside the contract.  The Quail long term contract example that was 
presented earlier is a good example showing this.  This finding is also in line with those of 
Helper and Levine (1992). 
I did not record any information indicating any change in the degree of formalization in the 
(written) contracts as a relationship progresses through various phases, however, what was 
changing was the use of the contract.  The relationship based on the formal written contract 
represents to a large degree a neoclassical governance mode, while the informal part of the 
relationship representing the relational contract does change.  Both from the interviews 
conducted and the theory framework presented we find that relational norms have an 
increasingly important role as a relationship progresses.  According to Zenger and Poppo 
(2002) contract types can work as complimentary to one another and not just work as 
alternatives. 
Limited information was recorded regarding the end of a relationship, but from the theory, we 
know that it appears as the norms are very important in this phase as trust may be broken and 
reason for the relationship ending.  At the same time reverting to the written contract may 
boost the commitment to a proper process and prevent a quick dissolution (Jap and Ganesan, 
2000) 
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7 Conclusion 
Through an academic journey of studying works from renowned authors and scholars such as 
MacNeil and Williamson, and through current practical and operational information obtained 
from various business professionals, I feel like I have addressed the research problem in an 
adequate manner.  It did however become clear rather early that this thesis would have to be 
of a qualitative exploratory nature and that I would not be able to obtain desirable accuracy 
and consistency.  Information about contracts and contracting practices was hard to obtain, 
and the choice of research design also limited the ability to make sound predictions or 
generalization.  It is therefore imperative, that the conclusions drawn herein are viewed in the 
light of this information. 
The objective of this thesis was primarily to document current governance structures, and to 
study the regional differences in contract type and degree of formalization between the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf and the US Gulf of Mexico.  In addition, a few research 
questions were added and deliberated on concerning triggers for formalization and contract 
type.   
The contracts for drilling and well services appear to mostly be governed under neo-classic 
contract law, especially for the contracts applicable for the Norwegian Continental shelf. The 
contracts in place for US Gulf of Mexico appear to have a stronger relational element to it, 
although not enough to be defined as a pure relational contract.  Both of the contract formats 
tries to a large extent to presentiate the future through written contracts with safeguards. Only 
limited focus is put on development of norms as a means to regulate the relationship. 
Degree of formalization was measured using 15 variables, and several important regional 
differences were identified.  The Norwegian Continental Shelf is characterized with limited 
long term explicit contracts with terms and conditions, plus a set of exhibits detailing all 
contract specific provisions.  US Gulf of Mexico is characterized by evergreen master service 
agreements with a list of applicable services, and sometimes with an attached pricebook.  
When it comes to terms and conditions the two agreements more or less address the same 
issues, but only 4 out of 11 provisions/topics were considered equally formalized.  The 
Norwegian Continental Shelf contract had a higher degree of formalization on all other 
provisions/topics.  In addition, the MSAs do not address Scope of Work, Compensation, or 
Technical Specifications which is a significant contributor in our definition of degree of 
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formalization.  In conclusion drilling and well services contracts for the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf appear to be more formalized than those of US Gulf of Mexico. 
I have throughout this thesis, from studying books and articles, identified various elements 
that impacts the degree of formalization.  These are summarized in three elements;  
1. Risk mitigation, representing formalization efforts made to limit assumed uncertainty. 
2. Security of supply, due to the high importance of timely delivery (because of asset 
specificity) and the effects of clear safeguards. 
3. Market conditions, in the form of size of companies involved, size of deal, and 
available infrastructure. 
Finally I also looked at how the contract type and contract formalization changes over time.  
The findings indicate no change to the degree of formalization.  For contract type I conclude 
with that the written contract is the most important governance mechanism in the start and 
end of a relationship. In between the buildup and cessation of the relationship, trust and 
relational norms play a significantly more important role, to the extent of actually governing 
the relationship on a day to day basis.   
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Attachment 1 
Transactional and Relational Poles 
  
 
Attachment 1 – Transactional and Relational Poles - Summary 
 
 CONCEPT EXTREME 
TRANSACTIONAL POLE 
EXTREME RELATIONAL POLE 
1 Overall Relation Type 
a) Personal 
involvement 
 
b) Types of 
communication 
 
 
c) Subject matter of  
satisfactions 
Non primary 
Segmental, limited, non-
unique, transferable 
 
Limited, linguistic, formal 
 
 
 
Simple, monetizable 
economic exchange only 
Primary 
While person, unlimited, unique, non- 
transferable 
 
Extensive, deep, not limited to linguistic, 
informal in addition to or in lieu of 
formal 
 
In addition to economic, complex 
personal non-economic satisfactions 
very important; social exchange; non-
exchange 
2 Measurability and actual 
measurement of exchange and 
other factors 
One side of exchange is money; 
other side is easily monetized; 
both are actually measured; no 
other aspects 
Both exchanges and other factors are 
relatively difficult to monetize or 
otherwise measure, and the parties do 
not monetize or measure them 
3 Basic sources of 
socioeconomic support 
Apart from exchange 
motivations themselves, external 
to the transaction 
Internal to the relation, as well as 
external 
4 Duration Short agreement process; short 
time between agreement and 
performance; short time of 
performance 
Long term: no finite beginning; no end 
to their relation or performance, except 
perhaps upon death of parties 
5 Commencement and 
termination 
Sharp in by clear agreement; 
sharp out by clear performance 
Commencement and termination, if any, 
of relation likely to be gradual; 
individual entry into existing relation is 
often gradual, as may be withdrawal; 
individual entry may be by birth, and 
withdrawal by death 
6 Planning 
a) Primary focus of 
planning 
 
 
b) Completeness and 
specificity 
a. Possible 
when 
planning 
occurs 
 
 
 
b. Actual 
planning 
accomplished 
 
Substance of exchanges  
 
 
 
Can be very complete and 
specific; only remote 
contingencies (if those) are 
beyond reasonable planning 
capacity 
 
 
 
 
Very complete and specific; 
only the practically 
unplanned (of which there is 
 
Structures and processes of relation; 
substance planning for initial period 
primarily 
 
Limited specific planning of 
substance possible; extensive specific 
planning of structures and processes 
may be possible 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited specific planning of 
substance carried out; extensive 
planning of structures may or may 
  CONCEPT EXTREME 
TRANSACTIONAL POLE 
EXTREME RELATIONAL POLE 
 
 
c) Sources of forms and 
mutual planning 
a. Bargaining 
and adhesion 
 
 
 
 
b. Tacit 
assumptions 
 
 
c. Sources and 
forms of post-
commenceme
nt planning 
 
 
d) Bindingness of 
planning 
 
 
e) Conflict of interest in 
planning 
little) left unplanned 
 
Specific consent to price of a 
good produced unilaterally 
by seller; short bid-ask 
bargaining, if any 
 
 
 
 
Inevitably present, but 
inherently relational and anti 
transactional 
 
No post-commencement 
planning 
 
 
 
 
Planning is entirely binding 
 
 
 
Enterprise planning can be 
expressed only through zero-
sum allocative planning, 
hence all mutual planning is 
conflict laden 
not occur 
 
Adhesion without bargaining 
unlikely except in case of entry of 
new members into existing relation; 
otherwise extended mutual planning 
merging imperceptibly into ongoing 
relation being established; a “joint 
creative effort” 
 
Recognized aspect of relational 
planning, without which relations 
cannot survive 
 
Operation of relation itself is prime 
source of further planning, which is 
likely to be extensive; may or may 
not be extensive explicit post-
commencement planning 
 
Planning may be binding, but often 
some or all of it is characterized by 
some degree of tentativeness 
 
Enterprise planning may be separable 
at least in part from allocative 
planning, and hence relatively low in 
conflict; merger or non-allocative 
enterprise planning with allocative 
planning may occur in ways which 
mute conflict and provide non-
negotiable ways for dealing with it 
7 Future cooperation required in 
post-commencement planning 
and actual performance 
Almost none required Success of relation entirely dependent on 
further cooperation in both performances 
and further planning 
8 Incidence if benefits and 
burdens 
Shifting of other specific 
assignment of each particular 
benefit or burden to one party or 
the other 
 
 
 
 
Undivided sharing of both benefits and 
burdens 
9 Obligations undertaken 
a) Sources of content 
 
 
 
 
 
Genuinely expressed, 
communicated and exchanged 
promises of parties 
 
 
External to parties and 
 
Relations itself develops obligations 
which may or may not include genuinely 
expressed, communicated and 
exchanged promises of the parties. 
 
Both external and internal to the 
  CONCEPT EXTREME 
TRANSACTIONAL POLE 
EXTREME RELATIONAL POLE 
 
b) Sources of obligation 
 
 
 
 
c) Specificity of 
obligation and 
sanction 
transaction except for their 
triggering it by manifestation of 
consent 
 
Specific rules and rights 
specifically applicable and 
founded on the promises; 
monetizable or monetized 
(whether by mutual party 
planning, i.e.  promissory or 
otherwise, i.e.  by rule) 
relation; same as the source of content of 
the obligation as to internal element 
 
Non-specific; non-measurable, whether 
based on customs, general principles or 
internalizations all arising from relation 
or partly from external sources, 
restorative unless breach results in 
termination, then may become 
transactional in nature 
10 Transferability Entirely transferable with the 
sole exception of an obligor’s 
ultimate liability for non-
performance 
Transfer likely to be uneconomic and 
difficult to achieve even when it is not 
impossible 
11 Number of participants Two May be as few as two, but likely to be 
more than two 
12 Participants views of 
transaction or relation 
a) Recognition of 
exchange 
 
b) Altruistic behavior 
 
 
c) Time-sense 
 
 
 
 
 
d) Expectations about 
trouble in 
performance or 
among the 
participants 
 
 
High 
 
 
None expected or occurring 
 
 
Presentiation of the future 
 
 
 
 
 
None expected, except perhaps 
that planned for; if it occurs 
expected to be governed by 
specific rights 
 
 
Low or perhaps even none 
 
 
Significant expectations of occurrence 
 
Futurizing of the present, i.e.  to the 
extent past, present and future are 
viewed as separate, the present is viewed 
in terms of planning and preparing for a 
future not yet arrived 
 
Possibility of trouble anticipated as 
normal part of the relation, to be dealt 
with by cooperation and other 
restorational techniques 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attachment 2 
Interview Guide 
  
 
Interview Guide 
• Introduction and objectives, names, positions, daily duties. 
o Please consider questions as talking points and not yes/no questions 
o I will ask follow up questions where 
o I will limit discussion to one hour 
 
Interview Subject: 
____________________________________________________________ 
 [name]   [Company]   [Title/Position] 
 
1. Please elaborate on content and structure in drilling and well service contracts 
applicable for the Norwegian Continental Shelf/ Gulf of Mexico 
2. What do you consider as contributing factors to the drilling and well service contracts 
formats in place for Norwegian Continental Shelf/ Gulf of Mexico? 
3. What pros and cons do you see with very formalized contracts/relationships versus  
less formalized 
4. How important are relations under a business and/or contractual relationship, and how 
does this change during the lifecycle of a business/contractual relationship? 
5. How does historical events such as the Macondo accident impact the applicable 
contract formats for drilling and well services? 
6.  Please mention some key characteristics of the contracts for drilling and well services 
for Norwegian Continental Shelf/ Gulf of Mexico? 
 
 
 
